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vSummary
This report examines the history of water re-
sources development and investment decisions
for the Uda Walawe Irrigation and Resettlement
Project (UWIRP), located in the southern dry
zone of Sri Lanka. The project was initiated in
the early 1950s just after Sri Lanka gained
independence. UWIRP was part of Sri Lanka’s
new postcolonial vision for economic develop-
ment and modernization; a vision that was
supported by multilateral and bilateral funding
agencies because irrigation was seen as an
engine for growth in the 1950s and onward. The
original plan for UWIRP is most aptly described
as a highly ambitious social, economic and
physical engineering project aimed at creating a
modern and profitable agriculture sector. This
plan envisioned bringing 32,780 hectares (81,000
acres) of arid land into highly efficient agricultural
production by constructing a reservoir and
irrigation facilities, and moving landless farmers
to the newly developed lands.
The description of over 50 years of progres-
sive development shows a wide range of difficul-
ties that constantly undermined the efforts made
to implement the plan. They range from design
failure and shoddy construction to poor mainte-
nance, from agricultural diversification constraints
to administrative inertia, and from massive land
encroachment problems by squatters to political
upheavals. What is striking is the contrast
between the (sometimes blunt) assuredness of
the hypotheses made in feasibility reports and
the reality on the ground, and between the
simplistic technological and social engineering
drive of the consultants and the complexity of
regional development.
Rather than adaptively adjusting to these
unforeseen changes, planners continued to
return time and again to the original plan and
launch successive attempts at development. For
each phase, investment was justified based on
specified outcomes. Typical ex post irrigation
assessment performance measures (projected
versus actual capital costs, implementation
schedules, and achievement of objectives such
as irrigated area and crop output) were used to
identify the extent of divergence between
planned and actual outcomes. These measures
underscored the rather poor performance de-
tailed in the historical analysis. However, a
comparative analysis of performance measures
from UWIRP with other developing-country
irrigation projects reveals that UWIRP’s relatively
poor performance, as measured by typical
indicators, was on par with many other projects.
These results support research from earlier
comprehensive studies (e.g., WCD 2000) that ex
ante irrigation plans tend to systematically
overstate proposed outcomes.
The rather grim history of UWIRP, coupled
with poor performance measures, is met with
some unanticipated results in the preliminary
analysis of costs and benefits for UWIRP.
Despite rapidly escalating cumulative project
costs, the growth in cumulative direct benefits
from agricultural production has outstripped
costs. The growth in benefits from agricultural
production stemmed primarily from two factors—
a surge in international rice prices in the late
1970s and early 1980s, which boosted the value
of rice produced, and the establishment and
expansion of highly profitable banana production
in the area. The successful dissemination of
banana cultivation and associated marketing
channels were due to the vision and efforts of
both farmers and local agricultural extension
agents. Since the UWIRP irrigation system is
used for many other purposes than crop irriga-
tion, the report provides preliminary estimates of
these other noncrop benefits, such as inland
fisheries, home gardens, hydropower, drinking
water supply and tourism.
vi
These benefits need to be compared to
other costs imposed by the project beyond
capital investment costs, such as environmental
and social costs. Although only limited informa-
tion exists on the environmental costs of UWIRP,
the social costs of UWIRP have been relatively
low in comparison to other large-scale dam and
irrigation projects, which frequently involve
reallocation of local populations. The UWIRP
project area was sparsely populated before
development and those living in areas desig-
nated for development (including later squatters)
were made into project beneficiaries as settlers.
Further research is needed on indirect project
costs, such as human health effects due to
unsafe drinking water and bioaccumulation of
agrochemical byproducts.
The report seeks to understand the decision-
making processes of various interventions over
the years and the outcomes of these decisions.
The analysis includes the identification of the
various decisions that have influenced the
project’s evolution, the rationale behind these
decisions, and how these decisions were imple-
mented. It shows, in particular, the interplay
between how projects are perceived, planned,
implemented and managed by various actors
(donors, government, implementing agencies and
consultants), all characterized by their respective
strategic interests and accountability. Particular
attention is given to the gap between planners’
vision and reality on the ground, and to the ability
of implementers to effectively bridge this gap.
Overall, this research illustrates the difficul-
ties of assessing not only project performance
but also project outcomes; the outcomes of a
project are governed by the evolution of the
behavior and choices of the different actors
concerned, in which their interests, mindsets and
strategies are embedded. It uncovers underlying
processes that shaped the evolution of the
project and highlights the limitation of viewing
development as a mere set of technical and
social engineering endeavors.
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Introduction
Irrigation projects promise substantial benefits at
the outset. While they have made substantial
contributions to economic development, the
price paid to secure these benefits has often
been higher than expected, not only in terms of
capital outlay but also in terms of social and
environmental costs. Questions are being raised
about the distribution of benefits and costs from
irrigation projects and their real contribution to
meeting development needs.
This report examines the history of water
resources development in the lower Walawe
river basin, located in southern Sri Lanka. It
seeks to tell a comprehensive story of “what
happened” and “why,” by examining planned
versus actual outcomes of successive phases of
development since the 1950s. A variety of
qualitative and quantitative measures are used,
including a detailed historical account of
activities, quantitative performance measures,
estimation of project costs and benefits, and an
analysis of decision-making processes. The
overarching objective is to look at the history of
Walawe river basin development as an object of
research and to identify some of the features of
“development” in the making, thus learning from
past experience and practice.
Structure of the Report
The report includes the introduction and six other
sections. The second section is mainly
descriptive and recounts the successive phases
of water resources development in the lower
Walawe basin during the twentieth century,
focusing on the Uda Walawe Irrigation and
Resettlement Project (UWIRP), which was
initiated after Sri Lanka’s independence.
Construction work under UWIRP began in the
1960s and the final expansion is scheduled for
completion by 2005. The original visions for
UWIRP have not been realized as yet.
The third section assesses the performance
of successive phases of investment using typical
quantitative measures employed in ex post
analyses of development projects. Some of the
performance measures employed include
projected versus actual capital costs,
implementation schedules and achievement of
objectives, such as irrigated area and crop
output. The performance measures for UWIRP
are compared with other irrigation projects to
evaluate its relative performance. The fourth
section provides estimates of UWIRP benefits
and costs. Measures of both crop production
and noncrop production benefits (fisheries,
domestic water, home gardens, tourism and
economic multiplier effects) are presented, and
the evolution of cumulated costs and benefits
are compared.
The fifth section seeks to understand the
decision-making processes for various
interventions over the years and the outcomes
of these decisions. It identifies the various
decisions that have influenced the project’s
2evolution, the rationale behind these decisions,
and how these decisions were implemented. It
discusses the interplay between how projects
are perceived, planned, implemented and
managed by various actors (donors, government,
implementing agencies and consultants) given
their strategic interests and accountability.
Particular attention is given to the gap between
what the planners envision and reality on the
ground, and the ability of implementers to
effectively bridge this gap.
Overall, this research illustrates not only the
difficulties of assessing project planning,
implementation and performance, both ex ante
and ex post, but also that the outcome of the
project is governed by the evolution of the
behavior and choices of the different actors
concerned, in which their interests, mindsets and
strategies are embedded. It highlights the
serious shortcomings of viewing development as
a set of technical and social engineering
endeavors, and uncovers underlying processes
that shape the evolution of the project.
Walawe River Basin and its Physical
Characteristics
The Walawe river basin1 covers an area of
approximately 3,000 km2 and extends from the
ridge of the central highlands of Sri Lanka, at an
altitude of over 2,000 meters, down to the
southern coast (figure 1). The basin offers a
clear contrast between, on the one hand, its
highlands and its intermediate mountainous
association of ridges and valleys and, on the
other, the lowland plain itself. Precipitation varies
significantly in the basin from over 3,000 mm in
the northwestern tip to around 1,000 mm along
the seashore. Approximately half the
precipitation is transformed into runoff and the
remainder is either used by vegetation or
evaporates. Some of the runoff percolates into
shallow groundwater aquifers located in the
plains but aquifer levels fall quickly after the
rainy season ends. The highlands are cut by
many valleys in which small streams, often
perennials, can be found. They feed the Walawe
river, which has an average discharge to the sea
of 1.1 billion cubic meters per year.
Agriculture in the basin is mainly rainfed and
includes plantations (tea and coconut),
afforestation and chena (slash-and-burn)
cultivation. Irrigation is practiced in the
mountainous areas through diversion of small
streams (see Molle et al. 2003). In the plain,
there are 600 small tanks (reservoirs) dating
back a thousand years or more, that currently
provide only limited irrigation because many are
silted, breached or in disrepair.
The Uda Walawe Irrigation and
Resettlement Project (UWIRP) is located in the
lower part of the basin. The Uda Walawe
reservoir is located in the middle of the basin
and supplies water to downstream areas
through two main canals known as the Right
Bank Main Canal (RBMC) and the Left Bank
Main Canal (LBMC) (figure 2).
1The Kachchigala and Karagan oya basins, which are small basins adjacent to the lower Walawe basin, have been hydrologically linked
with the Walawe basin under the Uda Walawe Project.
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4FIGURE 2.
Uda Walawe irrigation area.
History of Uda Walawe Irrigation and Resettlement Project
The natural, social and economic landscape of
the Uda Walawe basin is a living legacy of a
complex myriad of interactions between humans
and the natural environment. The story of Uda
Walawe contains a rich ancient history of
irrigation that dates back about 2000 years to
the days of the Ruhuna kingdom, which is
followed by a long period of abandonment. In
the late nineteenth century, British colonialists
initiated agricultural development activities in the
basin, including irrigation, but the area remained
relatively sparsely populated. In the postcolonial
period, one of the first acts of the government
was to initiate plans for the development of the
Uda Walawe basin. A centerpiece of the plan
was a large-scale irrigation and rural-
development project that eventually became
known as the Uda Walawe Irrigation and
Resettlement Project (UWIRP).
The postcolonial independence period of Uda
Walawe was a period of rapid change. To
facilitate the discussion, this period is subdivided
into the following four phases of development in
the basin.
5• Phase I: From independence to the
construction of headworks (1948-1967)
• Phase II: Downstream development of the
Right Bank (RB) area (1969–1978)
• Phase III: Improvement and rehabilitation of
the RB area (1984–1994)
• Phase IV: Rehabilitation and extension of the
Left Bank (LB) Project area (1995 onwards)
Before examining the successive phases of
UWIRP, a brief history of the area up to the
colonial period is presented.
Ancient History
Modern water resources developments in the
Uda Walawe basin are superimposed over a rich
history of water control and irrigation in the
region. Archaeological studies indicate that the
Walawe river valley was populated several
thousand years ago and known archaeological
sites date back to 6,500 B.C. (Deraniyagala
n.d.). Magama, an important city of the once
powerful ancient Ruhuna kingdom mentioned in
the Mahawamsa as early as 246 B.C., was
located in the middle of the present UWIRP
project area (Fernando n.d.; Collins 1932).
Because of its location in the dry zone of Sri
Lanka, tanks and irrigation systems were
paramount to the survival of ancient civilizations
and many ancient kings devoted significant
efforts to the creation and maintenance of
anicuts (small diversion weirs) and tanks
(Ghanawimala 1942; Narada 1992). As a result,
there are hundreds of small irrigation tanks and
anicuts scattered throughout the Walawe basin.
The density of ancient irrigation tanks in some
areas is one of the highest in Sri Lanka, with
approximately 1 tank per 2 km2 area (Mendis
1967). Some of these tanks are still in use,
especially in the lower part of the basin.
The exact chronology of these developments
is unknown but it is believed that the basin was
a prosperous area from the second century B.C.
and began to decline around the thirteenth
century. Until the mid-twentieth century, the
population in the Walawe plain dwindled. The
mountainous area retained denser populations
but underwent significant depopulation after the
1818 insurrection against the British. A number
of factors likely influenced the collapse of
communities in the plains, including repeated
attacks from enemies, malaria (Ghanawimala
1942; Ghanawimala 1967; Narada 1992) or the
attraction of better opportunities in the wet zone
(Obeyesekere 1984).
British Rule: 1815-1948
By the time the British arrived, the Walawe basin
was sparsely populated. Those who lived in the
area relied on the ancient tanks for water for
domestic and agricultural purposes, although
most people in the area practiced slash-and-burn
agriculture known locally as chena. In 1818, a
Government Agent visited one of the main
villages and described it as a thick jungle area
infested with malaria and populated with only 18
persons (Abeyratna n.d.).
Until the extreme drought of 1866, which
caused a high mortality and elicited strong calls
for the development of large-scale irrigation
projects, the British had only undertaken a few
minor settlement and rehabilitation works on the
ancient tanks and anicuts in the Walawe basin
(Steele 1867). The first large-scale intervention
by the British was in the southernmost part, in
Hambantota district, starting with the
rehabilitation of the Liyangastota anicut in 1889.
Figure 2 provides a visualization of these and
future works. The Liyangastota anicut, which is
part of the present UWIRP, diverted water to a
canal on the RB of the river to irrigate about
3,000 hectares a few miles further south. The
government sold 75 percent of the irrigable land,
with a theoretical maximum of 2.02 ha (5 acres)
per person, and reserved the remaining 25
percent for poor people (GOC 1889). Other
minor interventions included the development of
Hingura and Embilipitiya village tanks around
1890 and construction of the Ridiyagama tank in
61922. More irrigated land was developed
downstream of this tank in two phases (1925
and 1941), with 3,000 hectares of crown land
sold to local people. The investments in irrigation
were justified in dual terms—improving health
and livelihoods of the poor and earning income
for the Crown (Bastiampillai 1967).
By the early 1940s, the British initiated more
ambitious plans for the Walawe River Basin
Scheme. These development plans laid out
schematic “blue prints” for a large-scale irrigation
and rural-development project (eventually known
as UWIRP), a large upstream reservoir (wewa)
for hydropower called Samanala, and numerous
other dams. Planning efforts were discontinued
because of the Second World War and the
coming grant of independence to the colony.
Phase I: From Independence to the
Construction of Headworks—1948-
1967
Shortly after independence, the Government of
Ceylon continued the earlier efforts by the British
in the Walawe river basin. The government
rehabilitated some ancient tanks2 and continued
survey work and feasibility studies for the
Walawe basin scheme. The settlements in
Walawe were some of the first in the wave of
agrarian settlements of the post-World War II
period. The government sought to establish
settlements in the dry zone in response to a
perceived population explosion and agrarian
crisis. Settlements were construed as a type of
social engineering, whereby poor farmers from the
wet zone were given equal access to land and
the threat of land concentration and division was
combated by limiting the transfer of ownership—
allowing only one successor to inherit an
allotment, despite the contradictions with
culturally sanctioned expectations of families.3
Efficiency concerns were supposed to be
addressed by setting a rationalistic procedure in
the selection of settlers that took into
consideration data on farm size, land endowment,
“farming skills” and experience.
Throughout the 1950s, numerous surveys
and studies of the Walawe basin were carried
out. The Government of Canada supported a
Survey of the Land and Resources of Ceylon
that was published in 1960. This document
provided the basic factual information on soils,
land use and water resources for formulation of
plans. It also outlined a “plan for the
development of a large part of the lowland plain
of the Walawe Basin,” which included the Uda
Walawe reservoir and the Samanala reservoir
and eight other dam locations. Concurrently,
other plans were developed for the basin,
including one published by the U.S. firm,
Engineering Consultants, Inc. (ECI). ECI
envisioned a scheme composed of five dams,
including Samanala and Uda Walawe dams. The
plan focused on water requirements, economic
benefits and the potential for hydroelectricity
(ECI 1960). The ECI Plan was later used as a
basis for the Ceylon Irrigation Department Plan
of 1963.
While plans for the Uda Walawe progressed,
in 1956 the government rather hastily initiated
and implemented a more moderate-sized
irrigation and resettlement project that would
ultimately become part of the UWIRP, known as
the Chandrikawewa irrigation scheme. The
Chandrikawewa scheme was one of the first
settlement schemes and included the
construction of the Chandrikawewa reservoir
across a right bank tributary of the Walawe river
(Hulanda river) and the settlement of a total of
1,800 farmers on 2,023 ha (5,000 acres) of
jungle. Each family received a lot of 2.02 ha (5
2The Mahagama tank on the LB was among the tanks rehabilitated after the Second World War. This work included the irrigation of 580
hectares of rice land and the resettlement of farmers around the tank.
3This resulted in families keeping strong ties with their original villages, and they militated against the emergence of a new local solidarity
and society.
7acres; 3 acres of rice land and 2 acres of
highland for homestead4). The rights to some of
the land blocked out for the Chandrikawewa
scheme were held by a few purana (indigenous)
villages (Amunugama 1965). Most villagers were
absorbed into the scheme as settlers but some
village elders had over 6 ha (15 acres) of land
each and refused to cede their land for
redistribution. Their allotments were eventually
excised from the blocking-out plan. In addition, a
group of people who had settled 10 years earlier
in 3 villages had been left out of the initial
selection of settlers for the Chandrikawewa
scheme and they refused to move. Disputes
between “official” de jure settlers and de facto
settlers, including encroachers, were frequent.
While the Chandrikawewa scheme was
being implemented, planning efforts continued in
the basin. In 1963, the Irrigation Department
unveiled a plan5 for the Uda Walawe reservoir
based on design work by ECI that eventually
became known as the UWIRP. The plan focused
on the engineering design details for the project
headworks, with the goals of generating
electricity and providing irrigation. The plan was
to irrigate 15,378 ha (38,000 acres) in yala and
20,234 ha (50,000 acres)6 in maha7 along the
right and left banks of the Uda Walawe river,
and provide supplemental irrigation water for
approximately 6,070 ha (15,000 acres) in the
Liyangastota anicut command area. The plan of
the Irrigation Department focused only on the
design of the infrastructure and made it clear
that the main concern of the moment was to go
ahead with the construction of the dam. Plans for
downstream development were left for a later date
when “the system of land development to be
adopted and the type of agricultural crops to be
grown” would be determined. The plan included
two main components: (i) a 4-kilometer long and
36-meter high earth-filled storage dam and
reservoir of 240 million cubic meter live storage,
with electrical plants for a combined power
generation of 5.4 megawatts; and (ii) two irrigation
sluices with channels to supply the right and left
banks.
The project implementation schedule
envisioned invitation for tenders in 1963,
construction beginning in 1965 and completion of
the entire project, including irrigation channels
for 20,234 ha (50,000 acres), by 1974. In early
1964, the government invited construction bids
and construction began later that year. The River
Valleys Development Board (RVDB) served as
the local implementing government agency.
Shortly after construction began, the RVDB
began allocating land for settlement in Tracts 2-7
(see Appendix B), known as the Embilipitiya
block, in advance of the design of the irrigation
system, a procedure referred to as “advance
alienation” (ADB 1995).8 The RVDB brought
settlers to the land without the preparation of
blocking-out plans; a process of land planning
that takes into consideration the topography and
future location of canal networks.9 The RVDB
engaged in advanced alienation based on the idea
that the settlers could clear and level their land
so that they would be ready for production by the
4This area of plot was less than what the colonists were given, 5 acres of irrigated land and 3 acres of dryland, before 1952 (IEC 1954).
The allotment of 3 acres of rice land was reduced to 2 acres in 1964 (1 acre = 0.405 ha).
5Irrigation Department, 1963: “Development of the Uda Walawe Basin: Proposed Uda Walawe Reservoir Irrigation and Hydropower Project.”
6There is inconsistency in the values given for the total area to be developed, partly because some plans include existing development
and others do not. Later plans identify a goal of 32,780 to 34,398 hectares (81–85 thousand acres) of irrigable land. This estimate includes
27,114 ha (67,000 acres) to be developed downstream plus existing development in the Chandrikewewa area (about 2,025 ha or 5,000
acres) and Liyangastota anicut area (about 5,062 ha or 12,500 acres).
7Maha is the “wet season” from October to March and yala is the “dry season” from April to September.
8Tract 1, in the upstream area on the LB, was allocated for a sugar research station and factory, with a small section set aside for the
establishment of a hatchery for inland fisheries. Subsequently, the sugar research station was handed over to the Sevanagala Sugar
Corporation (ADB 1995).
9This resulted in difficulties with future canal networks. Proposed canals intersected some lots, others had to be irrigated from two or more
offtake points, and others did not have frontage to field canals that necessitated construction of ditches through the land of other farmers.
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9completion of the headworks and would also earn
an income assisting with construction activities
(ADB 1995). Between 1964 and 1967, about 800
ha of land on the RB were cleared and various
settlement infrastructures were constructed (ADB
1979).
Initially settlers were selected based on the
prevailing government policy that relied on
predominantly social criteria—landlessness,
family size and unemployment. However, local
members of Parliament eventually reviewed the
lists of candidates giving way to alleged
patronage. The RVDB provided each settler with
approximately 1.0 ha of irrigable land and 0.4 ha
of highland for homestead. Along with authorized
colonists (and even before them), a large
number of encroachers began to move into the
area in anticipation of future land grants. Hunting
Technical Services later estimated that by 1968,
nearly 60,000 people were living in the area. In
addition to the 23,000 purana villagers, there
were 9,900 legal settlers (located primarily in the
Embilipitiya area of the RB), 18,000 illegal
encroachers (scattered throughout the project
area) and 1,100 RVDB employees. Thus, by the
time downstream planning began, almost one-third
of the population in the area consisted of illegal
settlers whose presence ultimately put enormous
pressure on the settlement process.
Advance alienation, coupled with other
issues, meant that farmers received little, if any,
assistance in crop selection and production
methods. So they engaged in what they knew
best—subsistence-based agriculture—and
cultivated rice using traditional methods. Plentiful
and continuous free-flowing water allowed them
to cultivate rice even in highly permeable RBE
(reddish brown earth) soils. Such high water
duties and infiltration losses created serious
problems later on, when downstream
development occurred.
The reservoir was completed in 1968, “in
record time” according to Mendis (1967) at a
cost of US$9.46 million (Rs 46 million).
Contractors completed the canal and network
systems in Tracts 2–7 along the RB (up to
Chandrikawewa reservoir). Construction on the
LB focused on connecting the new system to
the existing village tanks and the newly
constructed Habaralu tank, and by 1968 the LB
canal was 17 km long (figure 3). Further details
of the construction are in Appendix A.
Phase II: Downstream Development of
the RB Area—1969-1978
Planning efforts
It was not until the headworks were completed
and the irrigation system was well underway that
plans for a system of land development and a
type of agricultural production were initiated.10
The first comprehensive feasibility study of the
project was done in 1967/68 by Hunting
Technical Services (referred to as “Hunting”
hereafter), commissioned by The British Ministry
of Overseas Development at the request of the
Government of Ceylon. The Hunting Plan was a
highly ambitious social, economic and physical
engineering project aimed at creating a modern,
highly efficient agriculture sector. It increased the
project area by over 10,117 ha (25,000 acres) to
32,172 ha (79,500 acres) by including the area
upstream from the command that would be
rainfed.11 It included detailed plans for such
factors as cropping patterns, production
practices, water use and settler selection.
In formulating their plan, Hunting took into
account the prevailing macroeconomic policies of
import substitution and food self-sufficiency that
were to be achieved through modernization of
the agriculture sector. The Hunting Plan also
relied heavily on the earlier survey work carried
out by the Canadian Government in the 1950s
and previous reports issued by government
10The 1969 ADB Appraisal Report on Walawe notes that “the investigation and planning of agricultural development in the area started much
later than those of the engineering side” (ADB 1969).
11Both the Hunting Plan and the earlier Irrigation Department Plan included 10,117 ha (25,000 acres) of existing development, the areas
under Liyangastota anicut and Chandrikawewa.
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agencies and international engineering
consultants. The soil composition of the
command area favored the production of other
field crops (OFCs). Soil surveys of the area had
revealed two primary soil types—heavy low-
humic gley soils (LHG) in the lowland areas
covering about 30 percent of the land, which are
suitable for swamp rice, and relatively porous
reddish brown earth soils (RBE) in the upland
areas covering the remaining 70 percent, which
are suitable for a variety of field crop such as
cotton, sugar, chili and onion (HTS 1968b, 13).12
Soil and water survey data were used in
conjunction with government macroeconomic
policies to devise a cropping pattern. The
Hunting Plan states that “within the limits
imposed by technical and social constraints,
development plans for Uda Walawe should aim
at the efficient production of rice, cotton, sugar,
dairy products, chilies and onions.” With
cropping patterns determined, the whole design
and planning process unfolded. The plan that
emerged assumed that all aspects of the project
could be “engineered.” For example, it was
assumed that all irrigated land would be double-
cropped annually, that the area under each crop
would be fixed, that “farmers will apply the
recommended inputs,” and that 12,000 settler
families would be selected based on their
potential to become efficient modern farmers.
The plan also assumed that the 18,000
squatters, who had moved into the area in
hopes of securing land, would be removed.
The very feasibility of the project itself
depended, among other things, on efficient
production of OFCs on the RBE soils. This, in
turn, required the selection of the “right” settlers,
adoption of the “right” practices (including
modern chemical inputs and efficient water use),
and eviction of large numbers of squatters
currently on the land. Failure to achieve this
objective would endanger the economic,
environmental and social outcomes of the
proposed project. In order “to reduce growing
foreign exchange costs,” targeted crops included
rice, cotton, sugar, chili and onion on 70 percent
of the irrigated land, which amounted to all the
land with RBE soils. Hunting stressed that these
RBE soils “should on no account be used for
swamp irrigation because puddling is likely to
destroy their structure,” and result in erosion and
other problems (HTS 1968b, 18). The plan also
stressed the importance of evicting squatters “as
their continued occupation is bound to prejudice
the ordered settlement and could compromise
the whole concept of the project.”
Taking into consideration the Hunting Plan
and additional research conducted by a FAO/
UNDP Mahaweli team, the government
published a Plan of Development and Estimated
Costs for the Walawe Project (GOC 1969). This
plan was based largely on the Hunting report but
reduced the command area and cropping
patterns to accommodate higher water duties
suggested by the FAO/UNDP Mahaweli team.
On the basis of these revised water duties, the
Government Plan estimated the total irrigable
area available for development as 27,357 ha
(67,600 acres). This area included 3,432 ha
(8,480 acres) of developed land (see Appendix
C) to which 2,133 ha (5,270 acres) of land under
irrigation from Chandrikawewa were later
incorporated.13
The Government Plan estimated the cost of
the integrated development project, including all
infrastructure, at US$73.6 million (Rs 438 million
in 1969 prices). However, the cost-benefit
analysis was based on US$58.8 million (Rs 350
million) to be distributed between 1964 and
1972. This later estimate excludes the
construction costs of main roads, hospitals,
schools and police stations because, the plan
argued, many of these would have been provided
regardless of the project. The reduced cost
estimate also excludes the cost of establishing
industrial units (sugar, brick, cottage, and sawmill
12The proportion of red soils was about 70 percent in both areas already developed and in the area proposed to be developed, based on the
estimates provided by Hunting.
13The Liyangastota anicut command area was excluded from this estimate.
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industries) and anticipated benefits thereof. Of the
US$58.8 million allocated for 1964-1978,
US$22.86 million had been spent by September
1968.
Full development of the RB
In 1969, the Government of Ceylon approached
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to obtain
financial assistance for the development of the
Uda Walawe Irrigation and Resettlement Project
(ADB 1969). As it would be ADB’s first integrated
rural-development project in Sri Lanka, ADB opted
to finance development of the RB initially and to
consider the LB upon completion of the RB work.
The ADB appraisal document largely reflected the
1969 Government Plan with one critical
exception—it allowed for the production of rice on
a portion of the area previously devoted to OFCs
that contained RBE soils. This decision and its
implications are discussed below.
The area of the ADB project included the
entire RB area (12,369 ha) articulated in the
Government Plan. This area included the two
areas that were already settled—Chandrikawewa
area (2,134 ha) and Tracts 1-7 (1,520 ha)—and
Tracts 9-21 (8,715 ha) that were to be developed
(see Appendix E for further details). The goals of
the project were to develop and settle Tracts 9-
21, improve agricultural productivity on existing
land, rehabilitate the existing irrigation
infrastructure and construct new irrigation facilities
on Tracts 9-21, and construct village centers and
other support infrastructure, including an
agricultural experiment and extension center.
Following the Government Plan, the ADB
project sought to provide water supplies to ensure
double cropping and enhance yields. It also
sought to accommodate about 3,440 new settlers
for intensive farming and to improve the
agricultural productivity and living conditions for
the 3,100 earlier settlers. Due to high water usage
in the existing RB command areas, improving
water-use efficiency in already developed areas
was paramount to further development in the LB
area. The ADB deviated from the 1969
Government Plan (GOC 1969) in one critical
aspect; it permitted an expansion of rice
production on to the RBE soils. According to
Nijman (1991), around the time ADB became
involved “the government decided that rice would
be grown on the well-drained soils of the area
upstream of Chandrikawewa reservoir. The
decision was taken on the ‘insistence’ of a then
Minister.” Visvalingam (1986) cites this as a
“disastrous example of the misapplication of
ministerial omniscience,” although one may
wonder whether farmers would have refrained
from growing rice, had this decision not been
taken. This expansion in rice area threatened an
already fragile project on a number of fronts by
taxing available water supplies, limiting economic
profitability and diversification plans, damaging
fragile soils and causing erosion.
At appraisal, the estimated cost of the
proposed work was about US$26.45 million, with
a government share of US$17.46 million and
US$8.99 million foreign financing from ADB. The
RVDB continued to serve as the implementing
agency. The project commenced in 1970 with an
estimated completion date of October 1973.
However, because of a variety of problems the
project was extended to January 1977, when it
was about 90 percent complete.
The project suffered delays from the onset,
beginning with a lag in hiring consultants to
oversee development of project design and
implementation. Finally, it was launched in late
1970 and construction began in early 1971.
However, the rushed time frame between the
hiring of consultants and engineers and
implementation resulted in “inherent deficiencies
in the original engineering design” (ADB 1979).
One major design limitation was a single-bank
canal system rather than the conventional double-
bank canal system. Others included poorly
designed control structures, lack of provision to
recapture return flows, an inadequate number of
cross regulators and measuring devices, and
limited live storage of the Chandrikawewa (ADB
1979). These design flaws were constraints to
proper water management.
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In 1971, shortly after construction began,
three events—of the many in a long series of
events to come—occurred that impeded
implementation. First, political upheavals caused
severe disruptions in construction. Second, the
Gal Oya project was completed and a political
decision was made to transfer 5,000 unskilled
workers from that project to Uda Walawe. The
massive labor force, which could not be
absorbed, financially crippled the RVDB. Third,
political tensions crept into the RVDB resulting in
changes in its top management, an occurrence
that would become common in the history of the
RVDB. Over the 10-year period between 1969
and 1979, the RVDB had nine different
chairmen.
Flawed design plans coupled with ongoing
changes in top management, a shortage of
experienced technical staff and a surplus of
unskilled labor, resulted in poor-quality
construction of irrigation infrastructure and
ongoing delays resulted in a number of
unintended, but serious, consequences. For
example, water use by settlers on previously
developed lands in Tracts 2-7 and
Chandrikawewa (who were used to receiving and
using the supply of water intended for the entire
project area) was so high that a 1972 ADB
review of the project determined that the
planned irrigable area would have to be scaled
back. This resulted in a decision to drop Tracts
20 and 21 (676 ha) from the originally planned
project area (see Appendix B).
Project delays and lack of administrative
control also created problems in land allocation
and settlement. Altogether, 3,300 new settlers
were projected to settle in Tracts 9-21. The size
of a holding was 2.02 ha (5 acres; 4.5 acres of
irrigable land and 0.5 acre for a homestead).
Settlers were to be selected based on their
potential to become efficient farmers using an
“objective” point system. Land allocations initially
followed the plan. Settlers were to be provided
with training to ensure they complied with
recommended cropping patterns and actively
cooperated in system operation and
maintenance (O&M). The plans also called for
construction of housing for new settlers.
Despite the plans to select settlers based on
economic criteria, political and social
considerations crept into land allocation
decisions very early on, partly as a result of the
tremendous demand for land by the large
numbers of encroachers in the project area. As
a result, “irrigable land allotments were reduced
successively from 4.5 acres (as originally
recommended) to 3 acres and again to 2.5
acres; homestead lots were reduced from 0.5
acres to 0.25 acres” (ADB 1979). By 1979, the
number of new settlers who were provided land
under the project was 4,143 (compared to the
projected number of 3,300), in addition to about
2,800 settled earlier in the Chandrikawewa area
and Tracts 2-7.
Delays in placing legal settlers on the land
further fueled encroachment and early efforts to
evict the encroachers proved ineffective. The
problems of encroachment were further
aggravated by the lack of land surveys and
markings for allotments and delays in issuing
land permits to legal settlers. Encroachment
created disputes among settlers regarding rights
to land and water use but no legal action was
taken. The illegal status of the encroachers
prevented their access to irrigation water,
institutional credit and other agricultural support
services. As a result, encroachers resorted to
force and water theft. These actions frequently
caused damage to the irrigation structures and
tended to disrupt attempts to introduce effective
water management and agricultural development
activities in the project area. The RVDB largely
ignored encroachment, which compounded the
problems over time.14
Due to mounting pressures for land and the
rather chaotic allocation process, settlers were
14Encroachment problems were not addressed until 1982 when the management of the project was transferred from RVDB to the Mahaweli
Authority of Sri Lanka (MASL). By that time, some encroachers had been on the land for well over 15 years.
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allocated land faster than the RVDB could supply
housing. The original plan to provide frame-and-
roof houses for all settlers was abandoned by
1972 and in lieu of a house the RVDB provided a
subsidy of US$50.25 (Rs 300). Only 933 of the
targeted 5,380 housing units were constructed.
This decision had ramifications for future
community development plans—it led to scattered
development and defeated the objectives of
cluster-style development, including the planned
provision of shared infrastructure, such as water
on tap and promotion of community cohesion.
The hasty and uncoordinated land-allocation
process also resulted in a total lack of training
and education to settlers, to ensure their
compliance with planned cropping patterns and
system O&M. Proposed agricultural extension
efforts, subsidies for chemical inputs, and
development of marketing channels for OFCs
occurred only on a limited basis, if at all. By the
end of the project period, the average
consumption of fertilizers was only about 20
percent of the recommended quantities. The lack
of marketing channels created severe problems
for some settlers who produced OFCs,
particularly cotton. There are many stories of
farmers who followed the advice of extension
officials and grew cotton only to find themselves
with no buyers and piles of rotting cotton.
The uncoordinated settlement process, in
combination with other factors (including credit
shortages, lack of marketing channels and
inexperience with OFCs), created an
environment where farmers opted for what they
perceived as the least risky approach. They
focused almost exclusively on rice production
using traditional production practices without
regard for soil types. This resulted in higher-
than-anticipated water usage, which exacerbated
the systemwide water-management problem as
the irrigable area expanded, particularly for
downstream water users.15 Thus, the decision to
expand (or tolerate the expansion of) upstream
rice production combined with poor water
management created substantial inequities
among project beneficiaries. Without water,
downstream settlers began to abandon the land,
which further fueled the encroachment problem
as encroachers often moved onto these lands
once they were abandoned.
Due to all these problems, the project faced
repeated delays. The original project completion
date of October 1973 was repeatedly extended
until January 1977, when the project was closed
with about 90 percent of the anticipated work
complete. Due to these delays and higher-than-
anticipated costs for construction equipment and
material, the project faced substantial cost
overruns. The project cost at appraisal of
US$26.45 million (US$8.99 million foreign funds
and US$17.46 million local funds) escalated to
US$33.63 million (US$8.82 million foreign funds
and US$24.81 million local funds), resulting in a
cost overrun of 27 percent. The government bore
the full brunt of the overrun, which increased its
share of the cost by 42 percent. Escalating
project costs, combined with the loss of potential
benefits of Tracts 20 and 21, were offset by an
unanticipated surge in international rice prices.
Between 1968 and 1979, increased rice
production combined with higher prices yielded
higher-than-estimate returns per unit area (per
acre) and resulted in foreign exchange savings
estimated at US$35 million. Thus, the short-run
economic sustainability of the project depended
precariously on continued high rice prices.
By 1979, structural deficiencies, poor water
management and inequitable distribution of
available water supplies continued to seriously
threaten project objectives. The original plans
anticipated that the Uda Walawe reservoir would
provide sufficient water resources to irrigate a
command area of 32,937 ha (comprising 12,662
ha on the RB and 20,275 ha on the LB).
15By 1979, of the 6,680 hectares in Tracts 9-19, the irrigated area never exceeded 3,846 hectares in maha and 2,834 hectares in yala.
Planned versus actual cropping patterns also diverged significantly. The plan envisioned that 59 percent of the land in Tracts 9-19 would
produce OFCs (cotton, chili and red onion in yala, and maize and groundnut in maha); however, the actual area devoted to OFCs ranged
only between 2 and 7 percent.
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However, the entire supply of the reservoir was
devoted to only 39 percent of the planned
project area, on average16 (ADB 1979).
According to the ADB Project Completion
Report (ADB 1979):
“… irrigation water use in the project
area far exceeds original expectations
and threatens to curtail further
development on both banks. Only about
70% of RB area envisioned for irrigation
at the time of appraisal is actually served
and this area is consuming 3 times the
water proposed for the entire RB area.
Only the lack of development on the LB
has permitted this excessive use.”
Phase III: Walawe Irrigation and
Improvement Project—1984-1994
Planning of rehabilitation works
The rather abysmal outcome of ADB’s first
integrated rural-development project in Sri Lanka
ushered in planning for a subsequent phase of
rehabilitation on the heels of the first project.
According to the 1979 ADB report, the “irrigation
system has deteriorated to such an extent as to
require immediate rehabilitation and improvement
in order to attain full utilization of the available
land and water resources.” Over the next couple
of years, the ADB continued to strongly
advocate a rehabilitation project aimed at
improving system performance and was ready to
start a rehabilitation project in 1980. Nijman
(1991) argues that the Government of Sri Lanka
showed little interest in rehabilitation and only
agreed to the rehabilitation in April 1982
because ADB made rehabilitation of Uda
Walawe a precondition to funding several other
high priority government projects.17
When the government agreed to
rehabilitation, there was no rehabilitation plan in
place. The UWIRP was far from reaching the
goals of the original plans to develop and settle
about 32,000 ha (79,000 acres) on both banks
of the Walawe river. As of 1982, only 56 percent
of the planned command area had been
developed, which included 12,000 ha in the RB
command area and 6,000 ha in the LB
command area.18
Due to poor performance, the management
of the project was transferred from the RVDB
to the Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka (MASL)
in 1982. MASL took a number of actions. It
increased agricultural productivity by
establishing two distinct growing seasons—
maha and yala—and instituting a mandatory
fallow season, which disrupted the reproductive
cycle of pests and disease agents resulting in
increased yields and improved water
management.19 MASL introduced rotational
irrigation schedules, as originally planned, in
some areas of the project to make water
available for downstream users who had
previously been denied irrigation supplies. This
was strongly opposed by some upstream users.
However, MASL took measures to improve data
collection and operation and maintenance,
strengthened agricultural support services and
initiated a crop diversification program.
MASL also began to address the
encroachment problem, which had essentially
16An average of 8,502 ha on the RB and 4,412 ha on the LB.
17According to Nijman, “First, the Appraisal Mission for supplementary funding for Kirindi Oya made such funding to Kirindi Oya conditional
to the willingness of the government to rehabilitate Uda Walawe. In addition, the donor would consider funding of a road construction project
in the Accelerated Mahaweli Program only if the government was willing to agree with rehabilitation of Uda Walawe. Another incentive for
the government to accept rehabilitation of Uda Walawe was the donor’s explicit willingness at that time to consider future loans for the
development of the Walawe Left Bank. The latter was envisaged to boost the EIRR of the donor’s overall investment in Uda Walawe” (see
Nijman 1991, 119 for further details).
18The LB command area included about 4,000 ha of existing rice lands and about 3,000 ha being developed under a state sugar project.
The command area of the Walawe project excludes an additional 5,000 ha developed under the Liyangastota diversion dam.
19Prior to MASL’s involvement, farmers planted rice throughout the year, so at any point in time one could observe rice fields in various
stages of maturation.
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been ignored by the RVDB.20 By 1982, an
estimated 4,100 illegal encroachers had usurped
land and many had been there since the project’s
inception (ADB 1995). Encroachment also caused
disputes among settlers regarding rights to land
and water use. The illegal status of the
encroachers prevented their access to irrigation
water, institutional credit and other agricultural
support services. As a result, water thefts
became a common practice. Some encroachers
resorted to use of force and often damaged
irrigation structures in the process. They also
disrupted attempts to introduce more effective
water management and agricultural development
activities in the project area. Although MASL
gave the issue of regularizing encroachers top
priority, work progressed slowly because of
numerous legal and administrative problems.
In a relatively short period of time, the MASL
efforts showed impressive results. Through
better water management, MASL increased the
annual irrigated area from about 11,000 ha to
16,000 ha by 1984. By creating two distinct
growing seasons and other extension efforts,
paddy yields increased from 3.6 tons per hectare
to 4.0 tons per hectare during the same period.
Through a culmination of these efforts, overall
rice production increased from 40,000 tons to
60,000 tons, resulting in a one-percentage
increase in the economic internal rate of return
(EIRR) from 7 percent under the earlier ADB
project to 8 percent.
These improvements were well received by
ADB. However, they argued that the project was
yielding only about 60 percent of estimated
benefits and these were too inequitably
distributed, with farmers in the upstream areas
receiving most of the benefits at the expense of
those downstream. ADB (1984) argued that these
improvements were “ad hoc and temporary, entail
high recurring costs that could not be sustained
over time without a systematic and well-designed
improvement and rehabilitation program to rectify
design and construction deficiencies of the
existing system.” From ADB’s perspective,
“because of the project’s current unsatisfactory
performance, it would not realize its long-term
objectives unless a carefully designed
rehabilitation and improvement program was
undertaken to rectify the physical and institutional
problems encountered with the project” (ADB
1982; Project Performance Audit Report).
In 1983, ADB financed a mission to identify
rehabilitation priorities. The findings from the
mission revealed that “[the] major problems
faced by the Walawe irrigation system can be
attributed to a past lack of management rather
than to inherent design or construction defects”
(Wolf 1983, iv quoted in Nijman 1991, 120).
While they considered major rehabilitation works
infeasible, they did suggest minor improvements
and rehabilitation to the irrigation system and
cited the need to consider potential supply-
augmentation options. ADB disagreed with the
mission’s findings, according to Nijman, and in
1983 hired SOGREAH, an international
engineering consultancy firm, to prepare a
feasibility study for rehabilitation.
By 1984, SOGREAH completed a feasibility
study for rehabilitation. It presented a detailed
proposal that involved “a major rehabilitation
within all distributary-channel subsystems
combined with a program of organizing the water
users by means of institutional organizers”
(Nijman 1991, 120). According to Nijman, “The
feasibility study thus proposed an engineering
solution for the excess water use in Uda
Walawe, without giving further project objectives
which would tackle the managerial performance
of the managing agency apart from training and
an operation and maintenance manual” (Nijman
1991, 120).
Several months later, ADB submitted a
Project Appraisal for the Walawe Irrigation and
20A number of factors fueled encroachment. The primary cause was delays in placing legal settlers in possession of allotments. The
abandonment of land by legal settlers, especially in the tail-end areas that received little or no water, resulted in more encroachment.
Encroachment was further aggravated by the lack of allotment surveys and land marking and the failure by the RVDB to issue land permits
to legal settlers. Prevention of encroachment was difficult because no legal action was taken as soon as encroachment occurred.
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Improvement Project (WIIP) based on the
SOGREAH plan. According to this document, the
primary objectives of the rehabilitation project
were to work towards realizing the goals of the
original 1969 plan for Uda Walawe in a manner
“consistent with the Government’s sectoral
development objectives of increasing agricultural
production, farm income and employment
opportunities” (ADB 1984). The overriding
objective was to increase agricultural production
and water-use efficiency in the RB command
area and use resulting water savings for further
development planned for the LB area. In short,
rehabilitation was needed to take the project to
where the 1969-79 construction phase was
expected to take it. The project included (ADB
1995): the rehabilitation of the RB irrigation
system, including the main irrigation system and
on-farm distribution systems; construction of
wells for potable water supplies to scattered
settlements and village centers; rehabilitation of
roads; provision of essential equipment and
vehicles to sustain O&M of the system;
consulting services and training; and plans to
strengthen ongoing adaptive research to promote
crop diversification.
While these were the explicit project
objectives, the project also contained implicit
objectives for MASL, including implementation of
intensive training programs in irrigation
management at system level and farm level, and
increasing the involvement of farmers in
irrigation scheduling decisions, regularizing
encroachers, adjudicating water conflicts and
collecting irrigation fees. The ADB Appraisal
report states, “it is believed that under the
project, the improved irrigation system with an
assured and adequate irrigation supply,
regularization of encroachers, intensive training
in irrigation management and involvement of
farmers in decision making regarding irrigation
scheduling, adjudication of water conflicts, and
collection of the irrigation service fee will provide
the necessary impetus for strong and stable
water user groups” (ADB 1984, 16-17).
The estimated cost of the 5-year project at
appraisal was US$13.7 million with US$11.0
million in financing from ADB. The project
commenced in October 1984 with an estimated
completion date of October 1989.
Implementation of the rehabilitation works
The project suffered delays from the onset. More
than a year passed before the international
consultant, Sir M. MacDonald and Partners
(MMP in what follows) was hired and had arrived
at the site. MMP was responsible for advising
and assisting the local engineering consultants—
Central Engineering Consultancy Bureau or
CECB—who would do the actual design work.
CECB was also responsible for supervising
construction. The design work took over 2 years
to complete due to a number of factors, such as
poor topographical information, problems with
earlier plans, and CECB’s lack of experience in
design works for rehabilitation of irrigation
infrastructure. Thus, detailed design plans were
not completed until 1988, one year before the
planned completion date of the project.
Beyond technical difficulties with project
design, work was delayed due to civil
disturbances associated with insurgent activities
of the JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna or
People’s Liberation Front) related to the
upcoming presidential elections. Insurgents
harassed contractors by demanding financial
assistance and killed employees of the engineer
and contractors. Field staff became reluctant to
undertake survey work and hold discussions with
farmers about design plans.21 This difficult
situation was compounded by the limited
availability of local funds and regular shortages of
cement. The Government Treasury did not
21JVP insurgents engaged in widespread intimidation of project staff. Curfews were imposed in the project area and that disrupted work. In
July 1987, insurgents used a contractor’s bulldozer to damage the Mahaweli Economic Agency (MEA) manager’s office. Shortly afterward,
insurgents burned down the design consultant’s office, which resulted in the loss of field notes and survey and design work for Tracts 12-14.
Under the guise of security operations, field staffs were stopped and their vehicles seized. A number of field-staff houses were also seized.
This created a climate of poor morale and distrust (ABD 1994).
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release funds as stipulated in budgetary
provisions. The situation was aggravated by
SOGREAH’s failure to properly estimate costs
and incorrect expenditure forecasting that created
a higher-than-anticipated demand for local funds.
It soon became clear that the actual cost of the
project would vastly exceed initial expectations.
In March 1988, the government estimated
that to complete the rehabilitation project it
would require an additional US$11.6 million in
addition to the originally planned US$13.7 million
(Nijman 1991). Of this amount, ADB agreed to
allocate an additional US$3.8 million to cover the
depreciation of the dollar and the government
financed US$2.2 million (Nijman 1991). The
government approached ADB for a
supplementary loan of US$5.5 million but it was
declined because of the anticipated low
economic return. ADB estimated that, with the
supplemental loan, the EIRR for the project,
including sunk costs, would be about 7.5
percent. Without the supplemental loan, the
downstream tracts of the RB command area
would not be rehabilitated. After much
discussion, the government applied for and
received a loan through the Agricultural Loan
Program, which did not contain EIRR
requirements. At that time, ADB indicated it
would not be willing to fund future work in the
LB area.22
Beyond rehabilitating the irrigation system,
the ADB appraisal report planned for the
construction of 100 shallow and 150 deep
tubewells for scattered developments. Shallow
wells were quickly abandoned because they
were recharged from return flows of surface-
water irrigation and tended to dry out during the
dry season. Little attention was paid to deep-well
development early in the project and it was not
until June 1990 that a contract was tendered for
drilling. Although a 1984 feasibility study by
SOGREAH suggested water-quality problems
might be an issue (especially salt and fluoride
problems), a careful analysis was not completed
until 1992 when 186 wells had been drilled. Of
these 186 wells, only 40 complied with World
Health Organization (WHO) drinking water quality
standards; excessive levels of fluoride were
identified as a particularly acute problem in
addition to high levels of iron. Signs were posted
at wells that did not meet WHO water-quality
standards stating that the water should not be
used for drinking purposes. However, anecdotal
evidence collected by International Water
Management Institute (IWMI) field staff
suggested that many people continued to use
these wells for drinking water due to lack of
alternative sources.
While the engineering side of the project
sputtered forward haphazardly, the Mahaweli
Economic Agency (MEA) worked towards
creating active water-user groups. In the project
area, as elsewhere in Sri Lanka, farmer
organizations had been tried in the past with
limited success. Government policy required all
legally settled farmers to join water-user groups.
So officially some 530 water-user or farmer
groups existed in Uda Walawe, and they were
largely inactive.23 In late 1986, MEA established
a subcommittee charged with the creation,
organization and training of more active water-
user groups. By 1988, 173 groups were
organized and trained (ADB 1995). Despite the
efforts, many of these groups quickly became
inactive. In 1987, IWMI was asked to provide
technical assistance to MEA on how to improve
existing irrigation institutions and to propose
structural and management innovations to
improve project performance (ADB 1995). After
an extensive study of the Chandrikawewa
Branch Canal, IWMI concluded that the
shortcomings of MEA’s early initiative with water-
user groups was due to: (i) lack of an integrated
approach to the water-user group program, (ii)
lack of resources to achieve high expectations,
(iii) delays in commencing rehabilitation, (iv)
22As a result, the government initiated discussions with the Bank of Japan about financing future rehabilitation and development in the LB
area of UWIRP.
23Encroachers were forbidden from joining water-user groups.
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political disturbances, and (v) lack of autonomy
among farmers in their relationship with MEA
officers (IIMI 1990a). IWMI made two principal
recommendations in its report. The first was to
improve integration and coordination among
various technical divisions operating in the
project area and, the second, to create stronger
farmer organizations with effective
communication channels to MEA staff.
IWMI also highlighted the lack of farmer
involvement in the design process (IIMI 1990b).
Up to this point, farmers were effectively
excluded from the design process for the project
because of the marked tendency towards
centralized decision making that characterized
project planning and implementation in Uda
Walawe from the onset. In an attempt to rectify
the situation, CECB consultants held discussions
with farmers once construction began to explain
rehabilitation plans, obtain suggestions and make
changes if possible. These discussions continued
through the remainder of the implementation
period and “substantially improved the
establishment of distributary and field canal
farmer groups by the MEA” (ADB 1995).
Farmers also became involved in the
construction process when, in 1990, MASL
moved away from large-scale contracts toward
medium- and small-scale contracts for
construction projects, and farmer groups were
allowed to bid for small-scale projects.24 The
choice of involving farmer groups in small-scale
contracts was motivated by two additional
compelling factors: “to foster a sense of
ownership amongst the farmers and a recognition
of mutual responsibility for repairs and
maintenance, and to develop technical and
organization skills amongst the group” (ADB
1995). This concept, which evolved from IWMI’s
research on farmer organizations, envisioned that
farmer organizations along each canal would
participate in the rehabilitation of their canal while
earning additional income. Initially, the concept
worked well. However, farmers became
disillusioned because payments were made to
farmer organization leaders and many of them
skimmed unusually high “overhead costs” before
dispersing payments to other farmers.25
Between 1990 and 1993, IWMI worked
collaboratively with MEA to develop and
demonstrate systems for strengthening farmer
organizations and for planning preseason
maintenance and water deliveries in the
Moraketiya branch canal (the main branch canal
of the upper right-bank area). This process
fostered mutual understanding on both sides.
Based on this case study, a carefully structured
program for establishing and strengthening farmer
organizations was launched in 1993. A major
impetus for this work was the strong political
opposition to the 1984 government policy that
significantly increased per unit area (per acre)
assessments for system O&M and stepped up
collection efforts. By 1988, the national irrigation
O&M policy was repealed and replaced with one
that required farmers to share in system O&M.
Under this program, the O&M of the distributary
and field canals were to be handed over from
MEA to farmer organizations (FOs).
The 1994 ADB report anticipated that FOs
would take full responsibility for the O&M of
distributary and field canals by the late 1990s.
This was a very optimistic assessment since
many of the FOs had still not become self-
sustaining and autonomous. Like elsewhere, the
effectiveness of the participation process was
constrained by the lack of real control by users
over water allocation and distribution, the latter
24During the same period, MASL terminated the services of CECB as a cost-saving measure and opted for in-house engineering services
from the Mahaweli Engineering and Construction Agency (MECA).
25However, there were exceptions in the distribution of profits among farmer organizations. In the Moraketiya branch canal area near Embilipitiya,
farmers worked on a shramadana (voluntary labor) basis and used the profits to set up a fund to lend money to lower-income farmers for
fertilizers (ADB 1995).
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being partly constrained by structural limitations
resulting in supply uncertainties. One overriding
obstacle to the turnover of O&M to farmers was
the system of patronage developed at Uda
Walawe.
In addition to organizing and engaging farmer
and water-user organizations, MEA extension
staff made a tremendous effort to increase crop
diversification. MEA instituted a mandatory fallow
period and introduced faster maturing rice
varieties. In 1988, MEA began an aggressive
diversification program that included training, field
demonstrations, and provision of seeds and
seedlings for OFCs (ADB 1995). This worked to
increase production of OFCs. In 1984, OFCs
were cultivated on only 5-6 percent of irrigated
land. By 1994, this proportion had increased to
roughly one third of the area, due to the
expansion of banana cultivation. It is hard,
however, to separate the combined effects of
extension efforts, declining rice prices and
occasional water shortages.
Banana production was a great crop
diversification success. Banana was cultivated in
the lower part of the project area in the 1980s,
but extension efforts mediated by influential pilot
farmers and technicians from MASL led to a
spectacular spread of its cultivation. The results
were remarkable. By 1994, bananas grew on
approximately 1,500 ha (14%) of the 10,500 ha
under production in the RB area (ADB 1995) and
reached 4,333 ha (out of 14,000 ha) in 2003. The
adoption of this high-value crop significantly
boosted farm income and the whole economy of
the Embilipitiya town. While other diversification
efforts resulted in short-term conversion to OFCs,
very little land converted to bananas reverted to
rice, although this has not been uncommon during
the past two years.
Phase IV: LB Rehabilitation and
Extension—1995-2005
Prior to completion of the RB rehabilitation and
improvement project, the Government of Sri
Lanka approached the Government of Japan for
assistance to conduct a feasibility study for
upgrading and extending the LB command area.
The Government of Sri Lanka initiated these
discussions in 1987 after ADB indicated it was
no longer interested in financing further work in
the LB area. Despite the poor operational and
financial performance of past investments in
UWIRP, the Government decided to further
develop the LB and complete the project as
originally planned in 1969. This decision was
made “in order to fully utilize and recover past
investment and ease the ever increasing
population pressure in the south of the country”
(Nippon Koei and MASL 1995).
In 1991, the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), working with
MASL, commenced a feasibility study for
agricultural development in the LB area, which
report was issued in 1992. The plan involved
three basic structural elements: (i) rehabilitation
of existing irrigation facilities in the “Old” area,
(ii) construction of new irrigation facilities in the
“Extension” area, and (iii) improvements in rural
infrastructure (Nippon Koei and MASL 1995). In
1993, the Government of Sri Lanka requested
financial assistance from the Government of
Japan to implement the LB Irrigation and
Upgrading and Extension project.26 The
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of
Japan conducted an appraisal in 1994 and
agreed to provide financing for the engineering
aspects of the project (Nippon Koei and MASL
1995).
26In 1993, Sri Lanka asked Japan for an aid grant to provide “urgently required development components” of the LB project, including road
improvements, water-supply facilities at Suriyaweva, and procurement of water tankers to deliver drinking water to scattered settlers (Nippon
Koei and MASL 1995). The grant was approved in 1993. With design work by JICA, construction began in 1994 with completion expected in
1995.
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In 1995, Nippon Koei was hired to review and
update the 1991/92 feasibility study conducted by
JICA.27 From their perspective, the objectives of
the rehabilitation and extension project were to
increase food self-sufficiency by increasing rice
production, increase production of OFCs, increase
employment opportunities, mitigate environmental
degradation, boost regional economic
development, and alleviate poverty (Nippon Koei
and MASL 1995). The scope of the project
conformed to the earlier feasibility study;
however, the review suggested changes in
cropping patterns, rural infrastructure development
and implementation schedule.28
Nippon Koei estimated the complete cost for
the project at US$144 million (1995 prices), which
included US$34 million for the rehabilitation and
upgrading of the “Old” area and US$110 million for
the development of the “Extension” area. The
implementation schedule included two phases.
The first phase involved rehabilitation of the Old
area with construction beginning in 1997 and
completion in 1999. The second phase involved
development of the Extension area with
construction commencing in 1999 and completion
by 2003.29
Nippon Koei concluded that the project was
“technically feasible and economically sound,
and the adverse environmental impacts could
be minimized by mitigation measures” (Nippon
Koei and MASL 1995, p. S-6). The economic
justification for the project included an
estimated EIRR of 17.8 percent and a cost-
benefit ratio of 2.16, using a project period of
50 years and a 10 percent discount rate. The
estimated EIRRs for the Old area and
Extension area were 11 percent and 22
percent, respectively. Estimates of benefits
were based on a projected tenfold increase in
farm income from US$293 to US$2,927 (Rs
15,000 to Rs 150,000) per hectare per year,
which seems overly optimistic at best (Nippon
Koei and MASL 1995).
In 1996, rehabilitation and modernization
works began in the Old area. In 2003, the
rehabilitation within the Old area was completed
and construction of infrastructure for the
Extension area was begun with hopes for a first
irrigated cropping season in yala 2004 (in at least
half of the area). It is too early to know what will
be the impact of the inclusion of this new area on
the management of the whole project.
27The terms of reference for Nippon Koei’s work included several objectives: (1) ensure that proposed cropping patterns are based on realistic
assumptions; (2) identify the impact of the crop diversification policy on water requirements, water supply and canal/structure designs; (3)
conduct a domestic and international marketing study for agricultural products; (4) study the feasibility of establishing an agricultural credit
system; (5) estimate the price elasticity of demand for agricultural products; (6) examine the potential for constructing marketing infrastructure
for agricultural products; (7) conduct a detailed environmental study; (8) review and update the proposed settlement plan; (9) review and
update the previous study on water and land resources, including hydrological analysis; and (10) design a concept for on-farm development
accounting for O&M of irrigation facilities (Nippon Koei and MASL 1995).
28The proposed changes to cropping patterns involved the replacement of sugarcane with other OFCs because the government had failed to
find a private buyer for the Sevanagala sugar mill. The review also suggested changes in rural infrastructure development. Based on findings
by MASL, Nippon Koei recommended consolidating the number of village settlements, from 22 to 12, and increasing the number of families
per settlement area. They also recommended increasing the role of international consultants in the implementation process due to MASL’s
decision to play a reduced role in construction management and supervision.
29The implementation has been delayed by 2 years.
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This section examines planned versus actual
outcomes for a number of key variables, such
as costs, implementation period, irrigated area,
irrigation intensity and yields. To place the
experience of UWIRP in context, these findings
are compared to the performance of other
irrigation projects, where possible.
Capital Costs: Actual vs. Predicted
From its inception and through successive
phases of investment, UWIRP experienced
substantial cost overruns.
Table 1 shows the estimated cost at
appraisal and actual cost at completion for
various phases of investment. In 1969, the
estimated cost of the entire UWIRP was
US$269.6 million (Rs 13,479 million in 1995
prices) for the headworks, irrigation facilities and
downstream development of 32,937 hectares.
Actual investment costs from 1964 to 1995 were
US$322.92 million (Rs. 16,146 million in 1995
prices) plus the proposed costs of the LB
upgrading and extension project, which yielded
an estimated total cost of US$466.9 million (Rs
23,345 million), resulting in a cost overrun of 73
percent. This estimate assumes that the entire
project is completed as envisioned. If
investments are tallied through 1995, the cost
overrun escalates rapidly.
While the costs of the project were 73
percent higher than anticipated, the irrigable
command area for the project fell significantly
short of what was planned. By 1995, only 55
percent of the planned command area was
irrigable. Thus, in 1995 the actual cost per
irrigable unit area was roughly double what was
anticipated in 1969. These data suggest that not
only did costs substantially exceeded
expectations, but actual benefits—measured by
command area—fell far short of those
anticipated.
Cost overruns characterize each phase of
development in UWIRP, with overruns of 27
percent and 85 percent, respectively, for the
ADB-financed RB downstream development
project and the subsequent rehabilitation project.
A number of factors contributed to cost overruns
over the years, including poor estimation of
costs, design and construction problems,
implementation delays, difficulties with
TABLE 1.
Cost performance by phase of development (1995 prices).
Project Cost at appraisal Cost at completion Overrun (%)
Million
Entire project: 1969-2005 (estimated)a US$269.5 (Rs 13,479)b US$466.9 (Rs 23,345)c 73
ADB-RB downstream: 1969-1978 US$26.45d US$33.63d 27
WIIP: 1984-1994 US$13.7e US$25.3e 85
LB upgrade and extension Upgrade: US$33.5f Project ongoing Project ongoing
Extension: US$110f
a “Entire project” as defined by the 1969 Government Plan, which estimated the total irrigable area available for development as 27,357
ha (67,600 acres). This area included 3,432 ha of already developed land.
b Appraisal cost equals 1969 total plan of development costs of Rs 430 million expressed in 1995 prices (GOC 1969).
c Completion cost equals total stream of actual investment costs from 1964 to 1995 plus expected costs of LB upgrade and extension
project expressed in 1995 prices (Source: Nippon Koei and MASL 1995).
d Source: ADB 1979.
e Source: ADB 1995.
f Source: Nippon Koei and MASL 1995. June 1995 prices (US$1.00 = Rs 50.00).
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contractors and unanticipated external factors
such as the civil war disruptions.
A review of available literature on other dam
and irrigation projects suggests a marked
tendency towards cost overruns. A meta-analysis
of nine different projects conducted by the World
Commission on Dams (WCD 2000) revealed an
average cost overrun of 54 percent. To verify the
validity of these findings, WCD conducted a
survey of 81 dam projects and found the average
cost overrun was 56 percent. However, cost
performance varied substantially. Of the total
sample, 25 percent cost less than anticipated and
75 percent experienced cost overruns.
Multipurpose dams, like the Uda Walawe
reservoir, showed substantial variability ranging
from a cost underrun of 22 percent to a cost
overrun of 180 percent. Performance was worst in
South Asia with average cost overruns of 138
percent. A similar exercise by ADB revealed an
average cost overrun of 16 percent for 23
projects completed between 1968 and 1999
(Lagman and Aylward 2000). Another
comprehensive study conducted by the World
Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department found
that large dams financed by the Bank
experienced an average cost overrun of 39
percent (World Bank 1996).
Another measure of project performance is
the economic internal rate of return (EIRR). The
EIRR or cost-benefit analysis (CBA) or both are
typically used to provide economic justification
for an investment. From the perspective of most
multilateral development banks or agencies,
economic viability requires an EIRR of at least 10
percent.
Table 2 shows the EIRR for various phases
of investment in UWIRP at appraisal and
completion. The EIRR at appraisal, which ranged
from 10 to 17.8 percent, plummeted to about 7
percent upon completion. This suggests that,
based on the EIRR threshold criterion of 10
percent used by ADB, none of these investments
were economically viable. The importance of the
EIRR in decision making is discussed in the
section on the Decision-Making Process (page 38).
Implementation Schedules
The planned versus actual amount of time to
implement a project also provides an important
performance measure. Delays in implementation
lead to escalations in costs and reductions in
benefits. UWIRP experienced substantial delays
in all aspects of the project except the
construction of headworks at the initiation of the
project (see table 3).
The implementation delays in UWIRP
generally concur with experience in many other
irrigation and rural-development projects,
suggesting a systematic bias in underestimating
the project implementation period. A 1995 review
of 57 ADB-funded projects in the rural-
development and irrigation sector found that “all
except two programs and one project,
experienced delays averaging three years …
projects in the irrigation subsector had the longest
TABLE 2.
Economic internal rate of return (EIRR) and cost-benefit analysis (CBA) at project appraisal and completion.a
Project At appraisal At completion Overestimate
ADB-RB downstream EIRR = 12%b EIRR = 7%(b) 5%
WIIP: 1984-1994 EIRR = 10%c EIRR = <7.5% >2.5%
LB upgrade and extension EIRR = 17.8 (17.4)d Project ongoing Project ongoing
a An EIRR was not estimated at the inception of UWIRP.
b ADB 1984, Appendix I, page 46.
c This is the most pessimistic EIRR as it includes “sunk” costs of investment since 1964. However, it only includes 60 percent of the cost
of the dam.
d The revised value appearing in Nippon Koei (1997) is 17.4. The EIRR for each area of the LB is 12.7 for the “Old” area and 19.9 for
the “Extension” area.
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TABLE 3.
Planned and actual implementation period by phase of investment.
Project At appraisal Actual Overrun
Period (years)
Entire project 11 To be completed 38 (245%)
Headworks 3 3 0
ADB-RB downstream 3 7 4 (133%)
WIIP: 1984-1994 5.5 10 4.5 (82%)
LB upgrade and extension Phase I: 2 6 4 (200%)
Phase II: 4 Project ongoing Project ongoing
30The most commonly reported causes of implementation delays include shortage of funds, institutional deficiencies including poor
coordination among executing and implementing agencies, optimistic assumptions about implementation schedule at appraisal, repair
and remedial works, changes in project scope and design, lack of farmer participation during implementation, and other external
factors such as civil disturbances, political instability, inadequate capacity of local contractors, and shortage of local supplies and
materials (WCD 2000).
31The improvement in water duty shown for the 1982-84 period, when MASL took over the management of the scheme is quite high
and is said to result from stricter definition of calendars and scheduling. However, there is some doubt on the validity of the data
(Nijman 1991). In particular, cultivated areas seem to have been overrated.
average time overrun of 3.7 years” (ADB 1995). A
similar evaluation of 99 projects by the World
Commission on Dams (WCD) found that only half
were completed in the estimated period of time.
Of the remaining 50 percent, about 30 percent
had delays of 1-2 years, 15 percent had delays of
3-6 years and the remaining 5 percent had delays
of over 10 years (WCD 2000).30
Irrigated Area: Planned vs. Actual
Outcomes
Table 4 shows the planned versus actual
command area for UWIRP for successive phases
of investment. Only half of the originally planned
command area was developed by 2000.
The actual irrigated area provides a better
measure of performance than the project
command area, which is the potential irrigable
area under the project.
Table 5 shows the planned and actual
changes in irrigated area for various phases of
investment. The actual irrigated area has
consistently fallen substantially short of project
plans. For the ADB-funded RB downstream
development project, actual irrigated area fell 47
percent short of the planned area.31 For the
subsequent Walawe Irrigation and Improvement
Project (WIIP), actual irrigated area fell 17
percent short of planned irrigated area. Although
irrigated area has fallen short of expectations, it
has increased steadily since 1971.
Figure 4 shows this change by season,
including three seasons with severe water shortage
when cropping areas were drastically reduced (yala
1977, yala 1992, and maha 2000/2001).
A WCD survey of 76 dam irrigation projects
found that poor performance, as measured by
irrigated area, was particularly pronounced in the
early years of a project. Over time, irrigated area
generally increases, usually beginning around the
5th year of the project continuing to the 30th year
(WCD 2000). These findings are consistent with
those experienced in UWIRP and with
observations by Berkoff (2002) that irrigated area
and cropping intensity targets are often
overstated by significant amounts but that over
time the gap between planned and actual irrigated
area tends to narrow.
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TABLE 4.
Planned and actual command areas of the phases of UWIRP.
Project At appraisal At completion Deviation
Command area (ha)
Entire project 32,793 17,615a –15,178 (–48%)
ADB-RB downstream 12,369 10,978 b –1,391 (–11%)
WIIP: 1984-1994 ~12,000 11,901 Small
LB upgrade and extension Phase 1: 2,900 Phase 1: Ongoing
Phase 2: 6,380 Phase 2: Ongoing
a Command area as of 2000.
b RB Tracts 20-21 (1,391 ha) were dropped from the project after a 1972 review due to lack of sufficient water resources.
TABLE 5.
Actual and planned irrigable areas at project appraisal and completion.
Project At appraisal At completionc Change at completion against:
Actuala Plannedb Actuald Plannede
Area (ha) %
Entire project M: 2,750 M: 32,793
Y: 2,750 Y: 32,793 N/A N/A N/A
T: 5,500f T: 65,586 h
ADB-RB downstream M: 3,017 M: 12,369 M: 7,024 M: +132 M: –43
Y: 2,309 Y: 12,369 Y: 6,036 Y: +161 Y: –51
T: 5,326 g T: 24,738 T: 13,060 T: +145 T: –47
WIIP: 1984-1994 M: 8,632 M: 12,000 M: 10,447 M: +121 M: –13
Y: 7,607 Y: 12,000 Y: 9,494 Y: +125 Y: –21
T: 16,239 T: 24,000 T: 19,941 T: +123 T: –17
a Actual irrigated area at appraisal
b Planned irrigated command area at appraisal.
c Actual irrigated area upon completion of project.
d Percentage change in actual irrigated area before and after project.
e Percentage of actual to planned irrigated area upon completion of project.
f From ADB (1969).
g 1970/71 average for RB command area only (ADB 1979, Appendix 10).
h From Hunting (1968a).
Note: M = maha; Y = yala; T = total; N/A = not available.
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32Cropping intensity (CI) is the ratio of the total crop area cultivated during one year to the command area (e.g., CI = 2 indicates full
double cropping).
FIGURE 4.
Irrigated cropping area of UWIRP, 1971-2000.
TABLE 6.
Cropping intensity, actual and planned.
Project At appraisal At completion Change (%)
Actual Planned Actual Planned
Entire project N/A 2 Project ongoing Project ongoing Project ongoing
ADB-RB downstream 1.69a 2 1.21b –28 –61
WIIP: 1984-1994 1.34c 1.85 1.68d +25 –11
a Actual estimated, based on command area in Tracts 1-7 and Chandrikawewa of 3,679 ha (9,091 acres) and actual irrigated area for
1971, which was chosen because irrigated area in 1970 was unusually low with an irrigation intensity of 1.2.
b Average intensity for rehabilitated area (Tracts 1-7 and Chandrikawewa) and new area (Tracts 9-19). However, there was wide variation
in irrigation intensity between upper and lower areas. The upper areas had irrigation intensities ranging from 1.46 to 1.78 and the lower
areas had intensities ranging from 0.43 to 0.90 (ADB 1979; PRC 1982, Appendix 8, p. 2).
c RB only. There was wide variation in irrigation intensities between the upper and lower command areas ranging from 200 percent in
upper areas to 40 percent in lower areas.
d ADB 1995; PRC 1982.
Note: N/A = not available.
Cropping Intensity
Table 6 shows cropping intensity32 at appraisal—
both planned and actual—and at completion for
two phases of investment. In both phases, the
actual cropping intensity fell short of the planned
cropping intensity. (Average irrigation intensities
declined under the ADB-funded RB downstream
project because per hectare water deliveries did
not keep pace with expansions in the command
area.)
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33Insufficient information is available on OFCs prior to 1984, but the area was very limited (e.g., less than 405 ha or 1,000 acres). OFCs
include sugar cane, the current area of which has been taken at 3,000 ha based on remote sensing evidence. This is almost twice the
official area but the latter number is admittedly understated in order to reduce the per area water charges to MASL.
Costs and Benefits of UWIRP
At the outset, irrigation projects promise
substantial economic benefits, including increased
value of agricultural production and boosts to the
local economy through demand for agricultural
inputs, marketing and transport of outputs, and
increased employment opportunities. Estimates of
these benefits, particularly the value of
agricultural output, have been used in conjunction
with capital costs to justify project investments
through cost-benefit analysis (CBA). Generally,
cost-benefit analyses, as practiced to justify
investments in UWIRP over the last 50 years,
have been limited to an assessment of direct
benefits generated by increases in cropping area,
cropping intensity and yield and direct investment
costs. This section examines some of the
benefits and costs of UWIRP. Beyond measures
of direct benefits, preliminary estimates of some
indirect benefits are provided, including domestic
use of water, indirect irrigation of home gardens,
fisheries, hydropower generation, the National
Park, and economic multiplier effects. Estimates
of cumulative capital costs are also provided.
Because estimates of indirect costs—negative
externalities—are not captured in this analysis, a
full social cost-benefit analysis is not provided.
Crop Production
The primary intended economic benefit of an
irrigation scheme is, of course, the increased
value of agricultural production due to increases
in cropping area, cropping intensity and yield.
Figure 5 shows the gross value of agricultural
crop production over the period 1970-2002,
expressed in 2002 US$ prices using the
agricultural GDP as a deflator. It shows an
upward trend in the gross value of rice until 1984.
In the 1990s, the value of rice decreases both in
absolute and relative terms, due to the expansion
of banana cultivation. The expansion of banana—
a high-valued crop—substantially increased the
total value of agricultural output. Other OFCs also
contribute significantly to that change.33 In 2002,
the gross value of banana was US$18.8 million
(Rs 1,790 million) against US$11.2 million (Rs
1,066 million) for rice and US$4.9 million (Rs 474
million) for other crops. Figure 5 also shows the
gross value of output per hectare. The 1990s
show a gain in the gross value added per hectare
of approximately 50 percent from the 1970s, due
to both rehabilitation and expansion of banana
cultivation.
The net benefit attributable to the project is
the gross value of agricultural output less
production costs. The question of whether family
labor and hired labor used must be assigned an
appropriate opportunity cost is debatable. In the
case of an open economy with alternative
economic activities this is probably the case. But
when there exists high levels of unemployment
(approximately 30% in Hambantota district,
despite the project and other similar ones in the
Kirindi Oya basin) it cannot be assumed that in
the absence of the project the whole labor force
would have readily shifted to alternative
activities. In the case of a settlement such as
UWIRP, which relieves local agrarian pressure
by providing occupational opportunities that are
lacking in the locality, the opportunity cost can
be hypothesized to be quite low. A review of
different assessments of production costs in rice
production since the beginning of the project did
not yield a clear picture of the evolution of the
relative weight of the different categories of
costs. On average, production costs amounted to
45 percent of the gross added value, 40 percent
of these costs being ascribed to labor, including
both family (30-50%) and hired labor (50-70%). To
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Notes: US$1.00 = Rs 95.40 in 2002.
Insufficient information is available on OFCs prior to 1984, but the area was very limited.
FIGURE 5.
Gross value added of crop production of UWIRP in 2002 US$ values.
FIGURE 6.
Net value added of crop production of UWIRP in 2002 US$ values.
Notes: US$1.00 = Rs 95.40 in 2002.
Insufficient information is available on OFCs prior to 1984, but the area was very limited.
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strike a balance between these different
approaches, we have tentatively chosen to value
labor costs at half of the opportunity cost taken
as the daily wage.
Cost-benefit analyses should not compare
before- and after-project situations but with- and
without-project situations. This means that even
if the project is not implemented, changes are
going to take place. In the case of UWIRP, one
may assume that the sugar cane area would
have developed under rainfed conditions (just as
it did outside the boundary of the project) and
that part of the area under UWIRP would have
been cultivated under chena (or permanent
rainfed crops). We must therefore deduct from
the net benefit of the project the net benefit from
such rainfed agriculture, assuming tentatively that
it would have expanded gradually from pre-project
conditions up to 60 percent of the total UWIRP
net area in 2002. Figure 6 shows net economic
value added for agricultural production from 1970
to 2002, which equals the gross value of
agricultural output less the costs of production
(including labor) and benefits that would have
occurred in absence of the project (e.g., the
“without-project” benefits).34
Domestic Water Use
The homesteads of settlers are dispersed
throughout the project area. An undulated relief
with many intermittent small streams and quick-
dropping shallow aquifers characterizes the
Walawe plain. This means that in the absence of
small tanks no permanent source of water is
available to humans. Infiltration of water from the
canal network and rice fields has replenished
shallow aquifers supporting scattered
development in the project area (Meijer 2000).
Along main canals and along riverbeds, people
obtain water from shallow wells that are used
primarily for drinking purposes. Boelee and van
der Hoek (2002) have found that in one location
along the left bank project area, groundwater
levels closely followed changes in canal water
releases and that canal seepage accounted for 74
percent of groundwater recharge.
Since the great majority of the settlers
within UWIRP use wells for drinking water,
understanding its value is important for future
decision making. The value of drinking water is
estimated using a replacement cost approach.
An Irrigation Department study found that water
users obtained about 20 liters per day per
capita from shallow wells and other
“nonprotected” sources. The minimum basic
need for water from a human rights perspective
has been estimated at 50 liters per day per
capita (Gleick 1996). The benefits derived from
the wells can be valued by estimating the cost of
providing an amount of water equivalent to the
volume abstracted. Recent communal water
supply projects in the region, mostly based on
wells, showed a cost of Rs14/m3, assuming a
project lifetime of 20 years. To estimate the value
of drinking water in the project area an average
cost of Rs 15/m3 is used. This estimate seems
reasonable especially when one considers that
the Lunugamwehera Water Supply Scheme, in the
neighboring Kirindi Oya basin, provides drinking
water at a cost of Rs 21/m3, including
amortization and operation and maintenance
costs.35
Based on an average replacement cost of Rs
15/m3, an average current usage of 20 l/capita/day
and a population estimate of 120,000,36 the
economic value of drinking water is conservatively
estimated at US$0.14 million (Rs 13 million in 2002
values).37
34The value from rainfed cultivation has been deducted from all crop categories proportionate to the planted area.
35For a project lifetime of 20 years, a daily production of 5.2 m3 provided to approximately 45,836 beneficiaries with running costs of
Rs 0.74/m3.
36Only one third of the population in the basin has access to pipe water. 120,000 corresponds to two thirds of a population of
approximately 180,000 people in the lower Walawe basin.
37This estimate can be considered very conservative as it uses a relatively modest per cubic-meter rate and 20 liters/capita rather than
50 liters/capita as the basic necessity usage.
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In addition, project canals are widely used for
other domestic uses such as for laundry and
personal hygiene that have economic value. They
also serve important social functions. A tour of
the canals in the late afternoon demonstrates
their widespread use, particularly for social
interaction and recreation for the children.
Although these uses clearly have economic
value, these values have not been measured.
Home Gardens
The homesteads of settlers are spread over all
the highlands bordering the irrigated areas.
Recent remote sensing imagery shows that most
land in the project area is now developed and
that while settlements are, in general, not very
dense they include significant areas of home
garden. The settlers highly value these home
gardens for their produce, shade and aesthetic
value. Most home gardens have varied fruit
trees (coconut, mango, jackfruit, breadfruit,
areca nut, etc.), vegetables, bamboo groves,
and shrubs and trees that provide building
materials, firewood and material for handcrafts
and medicinal use (Renault et al. 2000). These
home gardens also provide shade and additional
communal living space.
The development of these gardens around
homesteads would not be possible without project
water. This is proven by observations made in
areas where canals have been lined. Lining
reduces the recharge of the aquifer, hence
reducing water availability in the root zone of
trees, resulting in smaller fruits that often fall
before reaching maturity (Meijer 2000). The link
between irrigation canals and trees is also evident
from the expansion of home gardens. Figure 7
shows the extent of home gardens in the UWIRP
area in 1999. These gardens, which are now a
prominent feature of the landscape, constituting
28 percent of the land use (18,000 ha), were
virtually nonexistent prior to the commencement
of the project, as indicated in the 1956 land-use
map.
This “unanticipated” development of home
gardens and their fruit trees that feed on the
water table replenished by infiltration from canals
and rice fields, is generally overlooked. Research
carried out in the neighboring Kirindi Oya basin
(Renault et al. 2000) found that as much as 55
percent of the total evapotranspiration in the
Kirindi Oya irrigation scheme came from noncrop
vegetation (against 28% from crops).
To assess the production of these homestead
gardens, a survey of their composition and
production has been carried out on a sample of
19 different plots averaging 0.24 ha (0.6 acre).
The survey measured the composition and
quantity of different home-garden products
including medicinal herbs, fuel wood, bamboo,
fruit trees and timber. Home-garden products are
both consumed at home and sold in local
markets. The value of total production, whether
consumed or sold, was estimated at prevailing
local-market prices.
The results of this analysis suggest that the
productivity of 0.405 ha (one acre) of home
garden is extremely high and the average gross
product of fruits was recorded at US$248 (Rs
23,611) per year, including US$185 (Rs 17,600)
for marketed produce and US63 (Rs 6,011) for
the produce consumed at home.
In addition to fruit, timber is another valuable
home-garden product. The value of timber found
in the garden surveyed was estimated at
US$4,965 (Rs 473,700) on average, based on the
size and number of trees and market prices.
Trees are cut at an average age of 25 years.
Allocating the value of timber produce over 25
years yields an additional gross value of
US$198.6 (Rs 18,948) per year for home-garden
produce.
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FIGURE 7.
Home gardens (in green) in the UWIRP area: 1999.
To estimate the value of home-garden
produce for the entire UWIRP project area, we
used 70 percent of the homesteaded area as
appearing on satellite images to account for
roads, houses, and other non planted areas,
giving us a net area of 13,000 ha. The total fruit
production is therefore worth about US$8 million
(Rs 762 million) per year, to which can be added
a timber value of US$6.40 million (Rs 611
million; considering a 25-year lifetime), giving a
total value of US$14.4 million (Rs 1,373 million)
per year.38
It can be argued that in the absence of the
project some rainfed home gardens would have
been developed and that even though their
composition would have been different, their value
should be deducted from the full benefits
assessed above. Given the limited occurrence of
home gardens in fully rainfed areas in the dry
zone and the lack of data to assess their value,
these have not been considered in this analysis.
Reservoir Fisheries39
Fisheries located in project reservoirs are often a
neglected benefit of rural-development projects
(Renwick 2001). Fisheries provide alternative
income-generating opportunities and needed
sources of protein for the rural poor without
38Production costs (seeds, possible treatments, etc.) are neglected here. This may compensate for the non-consideration of home
gardens located along the main canal out of the command area.
39This section is drawn from Perera 2003.
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consuming any water. They also may provide
indirect malaria control, as fish consume
mosquito larvae, and support piscivorous bird
species. This section examines the economic
contribution of fisheries in project reservoirs and
canals to UWIRP.
In 2003, IWMI carried out a survey of
reservoir fishery activities in UWIRP. This survey
revealed the important role of fisheries in the
project area. Over 1,600 families are involved in
inland fishing in UWIRP, of which about 660
families are involved on a full-time basis and the
rest use fishing as a means to supplement family
nutritional needs or incomes. In addition, about
140 “middlemen” such as “bicycle fish sellers”
and other retailers depend directly on fishing for
their livelihood.
Survey work and related studies by Perera
(2003) showed that in UWIRP an abundant fish
catch is obtained from a diversity of water
sources, amounting to a yearly aggregate of
1,600 metric tons (table 7). The largest catch is
from the Uda Walawe reservoir, which accounts
for about 35 percent of total production. An
estimated 86 percent of the total catch is sold to
retail markets and the remainder (14%) is used
for home consumption. The estimated gross
annual value of fish equals annual market sales
of approximately US$691,000 (Rs 67 million)
plus the value of fish consumed at home of
US$103,000 (Rs 10 million; see table 7),
amounting to roughly US$794,000 (Rs 77
million) per year. Including only the catch that is
contained within the UWIRP project areas (e.g.,
Walawe, Chandrika and Kiri Ibban reservoirs and
production in small tanks and irrigation canals
within the UWIRP project area40) the gross value
of the reservoir fishery catch is approximately
US$567,000 (Rs 55 million) a year.
The economic contribution of fisheries equals
the gross value of the total catch less costs
incurred in catching fish. In a detailed survey of
fishing costs in the nearby Kirindi Oya project,
Renwick (2001) found that monetary costs of
fishing are relatively uniform among fishers and
roughly equals 20 percent of the value of the
catch. Deducting 20 percent of the value of
fisheries within UWIRP to cover production costs
from above estimate, the net economic value of
inland fisheries is US$454,000 (Rs 44 million) per
year.41
This value is augmented if we consider the
economic activities of well-organized middlemen
in fish markets, notably in the Embilipitiya town.
Like the fish vendors on bicycle who buy fish
from fishers and sell it in towns, these
middlemen also make handsome profits. But, in
contrast to the revenue accruing to fishermen,
this revenue is appropriated by only a few
operators who tend to agree and fix prices
among themselves. This type of market failure
seems to be quite common in the area and it
also concerns other agricultural products. Since
these middlemen usually buy fish at US$1.03
(Rs 100) per kilogram and sell it at US$2.06 (Rs
200) per kilogram, we may tentatively take half
of the profit as value added, allowing for both
costs of marketing and the likely non-
competitiveness of the market. Then the final
rough estimate for the yearly net added value is
US$743,000 (Rs 72 million), with benefits spread
across households (home consumption),
fishermen and middlemen.
Despite the importance of present production,
there seems to be significant scope for
improvement of fisheries. Management and
control of fisheries are totally lacking in most of
the tanks, with the exception of the Uda Walawe
reservoir and one small tank. Most fisheries
societies are declining mainly due to lack of
necessary guidance and assistance from the
implementing agency—the National Aquatic
Development Authority. The lack of institutional
infrastructure for fisheries stems from a history
40Of the small tanks 47% are within Uda Walawe. The most productive tanks are in fact those located within UWIRP and which benefit
from the return flow of irrigation areas (or sometimes direct releases from main canals).
41If noncash costs (including depreciation of owned boats, household labor used for maintenance and repair of boats and nets, etc.) are
included, total costs amount to 33%, leaving a net benefit of Rs 36 million.
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of intermittent government support. During the
1980s, the inland fishery industry achieved
considerable growth with the support of the
government. The government provided extension
services, fishing crafts and gear at subsidized
prices, free stocks of fingerlings, training and
legal support for fishers, made regulations for
better control of fisheries, established fisheries
societies and implemented community
development programs (De Silva 1988). As a
result of government support, the highest inland
fish production (39,800 tons) was recorded in
1989 (Amarasinghe and De Silva 1999).
However, in 1990 the government withdrew
its subsidies and support for inland fisheries, and
discontinued all regulatory and stocking
programs, which seriously affected inland
fisheries and led to their sharp decline over the
next several years (Amarasinghe and De Silva
1999). In the late 1990s, the government
reinstated its financial and institutional support
for inland fisheries and since then the fisheries
have gradually recovered (Amarasinghe 2003).
When the government resumed its support with
the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Act No.
1996, it conferred control and management of
fish resources to Fisheries Management
Committees instead of local fisheries societies.
Only the Uda Walawe Reservoir Fisheries
Society is effectively functioning at present
because of good catches in the reservoir and
the active supporting role played by the National
Aquatic Development Authority and the
Department of Wildlife Conservation.
National Park
The Uda Walawe reservoir is a central feature of
the Uda Walawe National Park (30,821 ha). Herds
of elephant and other wildlife congregate along
the shores of the reservoir. While the value of the
park in terms of wildlife and biodiversity
preservation is beyond the scope of this
research, its value as a tourist spot is important
to the local and regional economy. A relatively
simple gauge of its importance is the number of
tourists visiting the park each year. Although the
area was declared a park in 1971, it was only at
the end of the decade that villagers were moved
out and resettled and poaching and logging were
curbed (Alwis n.d.). The problems, however,
remain endemic and even include the cultivation
of ganja (cannabis) within the park and in its
vicinities.
Available data on admissions to the park
and fees collected42 were obtained from park
officials and DWLC-FAO 1997 (see Appendix F).
In the 1994-2001 period, 452,000 persons, 20
percent of whom were foreigners, visited the
park. The average revenue for the 1998-2001
period was US$280,000 (2002 values). The park
employs 60 persons full-time and there are 20
guides who work in association with a 4x4
vehicle company placed under the control of the
Provincial Council. The revenue should include
the benefits generated by these two additional
activities, while the O&M costs of the park
should be subtracted. In the absence of such
data, we may consider that these additional
costs and benefits cancel each other and retain
US$280,000 as an order of magnitude of the
yearly benefit generated by the park.
Energy Generation (at the Uda Walawe
Dam)
Both water towers delivering water to the right
and left bank main canals are equipped with
turbines and electricity is generated as a
byproduct of irrigation water release. These
turbines produce an average of 15 GWh per year.
To estimate the value of energy generated we
use the least-cost alternative to hydroelectricity in
Sri Lanka, which is thermal energy. Based on
Somatilake (2002), the average cost of
purchasing thermal energy from a private source
42In Sri Lanka, most tourist locations charge two-tier entrance fees—one for locals and the other for international tourists. Current fees are at
US$0.23 (Rs 23) for nationals and US$15.00 (Rs 1,500) for foreigners.
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is Rs 7/kWh. Using this estimate the value of
energy generated at UWIRP is US$1.1 million per
year (Rs 105 million per year; 2002 prices).
Backward/Forward Linkages and Other
Multiplier Effects
Apart from farmers themselves, many other
actors thrive on the development of irrigated
agriculture. Backward linkages include economic
activity generated as a result of agricultural
production through expenditures on such items
as seeds, fertilizers and machinery. Forward
linkages refer to post-harvest economic activities
such as storage, transportation, marketing,
exports, etc. Economists measure economic
activity through backward and forward linkages
by “multipliers.” For example, a multiplier of 2.50
implies that for each US dollar generated in
agricultural output, another US$ 1.50 is
generated through backward and forward
linkages.
Although the concept of economic multipliers
is well understood and accepted, calculating
multipliers is an extremely involved process.
Bhattarai et al. (2003) conducted a review of the
literature and found multipliers for irrigated
agriculture that ranged from 1.87 in Malaysia
(Bell et al. 1982), through 1.87-2.18 in North-
Arcot, India (Hazell et al. 1991) to 2.2-3.2 in
South Africa (Hassan 2003).43 In their study of
irrigation in India, Bhattarai et al. (2003) estimate
two different types of irrigation multipliers, per
crop season and per hectare/year (including
livestock). The first irrigation multiplier value is
4.5, which implies that an increase of US$100 per
hectare per crop season in the gross value of
crop outputs in an irrigated area would generate
another US$350 of indirect benefits (or secondary
benefits) in the local economy. The per hectare
irrigation multiplier was estimated at 3.15,
meaning that only 32 percent of the total benefits
of irrigation is actually obtained by Indian farmers,
the rest of the benefits spilling over to the
regional economy.
No attempt to estimate backward/forward
and consumption linkages has been made so far
for UWIRP. Although the above studies are not
fully comparable in terms of methodology, they
suggest that a significant part of the benefits of
an irrigation project accrue to other sectors and
activities of the region, prompting questions on
the limitation of historical approaches used to
estimate direct benefits.
Impact on Poverty
The impressive growth of the population in the
area from 2,000 in the 1950s to 200,000
presently is in itself a telling illustration of the
employment and income-generating opportunities
produced by UWIRP. The impact of irrigation
development on poverty has been recently
studied in the Left Bank area of the project where
a detailed household survey instrument was used
to compare poverty measures for households with
and without access to irrigation infrastructure
(Hussein et al. 2002; Hussein et al. 2003;
Hussein et al. 2004). Relying on survey data from
858 households, study results revealed large
discrepancies in terms of chronic and transient
poverty between households in typical rainfed and
irrigated areas. Table 8 exemplifies some of the
differences found between irrigated, rainfed-
typical, and rainfed-nontypical (sugarcane) areas.
Household income in irrigated areas is 80 percent
higher than that in rainfed areas. However this
income discrepancy is reduced in rainfed
sugarcane areas, with income from irrigated
cropland 42 percent higher than that in rainfed
sugarcane land. Irrigated agriculture is also much
more labor absorbing than rainfed agriculture.
43Studies in developed countries have found higher values: 5 in New South Wales, Australia (Powell et al. 1985) and 6 in Canada (Hill and
Tollefson 1996).
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Other Positive and Negative
Externalities
In addition to the benefits described above, other
positive externalities can be added, such as flood
control (reduction of damage in Hambantota)44 and
nonagricultural water use (factories). However, it
is also necessary to consider negative
externalities of the project. Since Uda Walawe is
a settlement project based on the reclamation of
lands hitherto little used (some lowland rice fields
and some chena cultivation) the impact on
existing populations has been limited. On the
contrary, residents in the area were in general
selected as settlers and were given land. Two
categories of people have nevertheless seen their
livelihoods threatened by the successive
developments of the project, i.e., those living on
fisheries in the coastal lagoons and the cattle
farmers who need extensive areas for pasture
(Birner 1996).
Approximately 500 families relied on shrimp
production in the coastal lagoons before they
became flooded with drainage water from the
lower RB. This ecological change modified
aquatic resources as well as flora, with a
spectacular colonization of the lagoon by the
mangrove tree Sonneratia caseolaris (Jayatissa
et al. 2002). Villagers in the area reported that
only 25 families are now deriving their main
revenue from the lagoon. Most of the remaining
families are said to have shifted to marine
fisheries (Senaratna and Clemett 2003).
Other possible externalities refer to
environmental changes and their impact on
wildlife and biodiversity, as well as health
impacts of malaria or consumption of unsuitable
groundwater (fluoride). Perhaps one of the great,
potential, hidden costs is human health risk from
unsafe drinking water and bioaccumulation of
agrochemical byproducts through regular
consumption of reservoir fish in the project area.
These different externalities have not been
assessed in detail for lack of means but they
must be cited here, even in qualitative terms, to
illustrate the variety of impacts that should be
factored in to achieve a more comprehensive
view and impact assessment.
Cumulated Costs and Benefits
The cumulative costs of all capital investments in
UWIRP from its inception in 1964 through 2001
are shown in figure 8. As of 2001, the total
capital investment costs of the project reached
US$251.6 million (Rs 24 billion), while O&M costs
exceeded US$52.4 million (Rs 5 billion),
TABLE 8.
Socioeconomic indicators in three settings, Walawe Left Bank area.
Indicator Irrigated area Rainfed-typical area Rainfed-nontypical area (sugarcane)
Average family size 5.05 4.9 4.75
Average land size (ha) 1 1.47 1.59
Annual net value of product (Rs/ha) 63,192 15,060 52,620
Labor use (person-day/ha/year) 67.2 28.0 58.3
Annual household income (Rs) 108,542 60,295 76,134
Crop income (% of total) 52 33 51
Ratio of food to nonfood expenditures 0.56 0.62 0.62
Source: Hussein et al. 2004.
Note: US$1.00 = Rs 97.50 (January 2004).
44For example, extreme flood events in 1912 and, particularly, in 1940 provoked extensive damage in the lower parts of the basin.
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FIGURE 8.
Cumulative capital and O&M costs for Uda Walawe: 1974-2001 (in 2002 US$ values).
Note: US$1.00 = Rs 95.40 in 2002.
45Detailed cost data were gathered from the Mahaweli Authority and supplemented with data from the Asian Development Bank (1969
and 1994). Costs are expressed in 2002 prices using the agricultural GDP deflator series. Using the consumer price index yields very
similar results.
46Considering a lifetime of 25 years for the foregone investment.
expressed in 2002 prices.45 These costs should
be compared to cumulative direct benefits from
agricultural production. Depending on whether or
not labor costs are included, these benefits range
from US$392.0 million (Rs 37.4 billion) when all
labor costs are included, through US$448.6
million (Rs 42.8 billion) when half of labor costs
are included, to US$505.2 million (Rs 48.2 billion)
without labor costs (see discussion above for
further details). This gives a benefit-cost (BC)
ratio of 1.63, 1.43 and 1.24, respectively. It must
be noted, however, that the costs considered here
do not include replacement of infrastructure.
Figure 9 shows both cumulated costs and
benefits. It can be seen that the year in which
benefits begin to exceed costs is 1987 when
labor is excluded, 1990 with labor costs
estimated at 50 percent of their opportunity cost
and 1993 with 100 percent labor costs.
Banana production plays a critical role in
bolstering project benefits. Banana production
involved fairly low production costs relative to its
gross value. If we assume that all the area
converted to banana had remained under rice
cultivation, then the BC ratio in 2000 would only
be 1.15 (with 50% of labor considered).
Altogether, it may be more straightforward to
compare actual benefits for the current year,
rather than for a long series, as many factors and
conditions have changed. The current annual net
benefit of irrigated agriculture in the UWIRP
project area is approximately US$25 million (Rs
2,380 million). Other water-related benefits
include: US$0.75 million (Rs 72 million) for
fisheries, US$0.28 million (Rs 27 million) for Uda
Walawe National Park, US$1.1 million (Rs 105
million) for energy generation, US$14.4 (Rs 1,370
million) for home-garden produce (45% of this in
timber capital), and US$140,000 (Rs 13 million)
for domestic water.46 Indirect benefits other than
that from home gardens, therefore, amount to
approximately 9 percent of crop benefits. Figure
10 summarizes all these primary and secondary
benefits and shows that home-garden products
other than timber generated more benefits than
rice production.
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FIGURE 9.
Cumulative crop benefits and costs for Uda Walawe: 1974-2002 (in 2002 US$ values).
FIGURE 10.
Summary of crop and noncrop benefits derived from UWIRP (in 2002 US$ values).
Note: US$1.00 = Rs 95.40 in 2002.
38
The investments made in the twentieth century in
the Walawe river basin have been based on
technical, economic, social and political grounds.
This section reviews the most salient
justifications of decision making emerging from
the descriptions of the preceding sections. It then
focuses on how cost-benefit analysis and
concerns for cost recovery have been factored in,
and on the role they play in decision making.
Last, it attempts a wider reflection on the
interests and strategies of the different actors
involved in planning and decision making.
Chief Justifications and Ideologies
The goals and means of development during the
British rule were clear. Colonial administrators
sought to protect and uplift the poor people, and
to involve them in productive capitalistic
investments that would yield net revenues to the
Crown. A good example of these twin goals can
be found in the following report (Steele 1867) on
the Hambantota province:
“Much might be done, and ought to
be done, in utilizing the streams which
run through the district, pouring into the
Indian Ocean their, not superfluous, but
inappropriate waters which, rightly
directed, should replenish and invigorate
the thirsty land and people. By a well-
devised system of anicuts, sluices and
channels, this would be feasible enough;
and the day is, I trust, not far distant
which we will see this simple, but
magnificent and really noble and
philanthropic, enterprise accomplished.
Nor will it be a barren philanthropy, I
mean, in point of pecuniary profit even.”
The postwar and postindependence
investments in the area were clearly part of the
larger policy of resettling populations in the dry
zones of the country, both in the north-central and
southern parts of the island. The policy was
motivated by a growing population and inadequate
access to land and water resources, generating a
demand for land, which was already acute in
colonial times. Sri Lanka was still an exclusively
agricultural economy and was bent on achieving
self-sufficiency in rice. Settlements were
modernist pieces of social engineering aimed at
building up a self-reliant and independent farming
population provided with decent socioeconomic
infrastructures. Selection of settlers was
supposed to follow a mix of efficiency (e.g.,
emphasis on modern agricultural production) and
equity (e.g., providing land to landless poor,
prohibiting land concentration and land
fragmentation) objectives.47 The postcolonial state
built part of its legitimacy on taking over the
“development mission.” The 1954 International
Engineering Company (IEC) report on Walawe
(IEC 1954) provides a good description of the
host of aspirations that were supposed to be
fulfilled through settlements:
“It is demonstrated that the colonists
on the project would be given an
opportunity to enjoy a decent standard of
living, have a nutritional diet, and have
money available for luxuries, savings and
rent. The project would provide
appreciable social and economic benefits
to the people of Ceylon… including,
electricity at reasonable costs, increasing
food production thus reducing imports,
improvement of the external trade
balance, [and] providing additional jobs as
a result of the labor required.”
Decision-Making Process
47See Farmer 1976 for more general considerations.
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Likewise, the 1960 ECI report on the Uda
Walawe scheme (ECI 1960) emphasizes that
“there exists in the Walawe basin a large,
unbroken area of lowland plain that appears to
merit agricultural development and yet, at
present, is very sparsely inhabited. It is clear that
such a development would help alleviate Ceylon’s
economic problems.”48 Since the area is in the
dry zone, “the irrigation system must be designed
and constructed in such a way that the cultivator
is protected completely against famine resulting
from drought.” The report also addresses crop
diversification, envisioning extensive areas of
cotton and sugarcane, since “the possibility of
diversifying and balancing the agricultural
economy by the growing under irrigation of
commercial crops and other food crops in addition
to rice has not received enough attention in
Ceylon.”
The 1968 Hunting report epitomizes technical
hubris and the paternalistic or authoritarian
planning typical of the time. The three main
stated objectives of the project were “to attain a
highly productive cash agriculture generating
income-earning opportunities and to promote
maximum alternative employment to farming,”49
and to reduce imports of agricultural products.
The plan is presented as rigorous and technically
sound, the options taken as self-evident and
indisputable, and cropping patterns as evident.
The technical recommendations would be
compulsory, squatters would be evicted and
farmers would benefit from “sympathetic advisory
services.” Their social cohesion would be ensured
by adequate grouped settlements.
This flamboyant plan was not fully
endorsed by the ADB feasibility study (in
particular, irrigated areas to be developed were
disregarded in the plan and attention was
focused on the RB only), but it retained much
of its modernist and paternalistic drive. The
Uda Walawe project was promoted as an
“Integrated Development Scheme,” a
fashionable concept at the time. It befits the
“pseudo-comprehensive-programs” described by
Hirschman, with extravagant claims that give
decision makers the “illusion that the ‘experts’
have already found all the answers to the
problems and that all that is needed is faithful
implementation” (Hirschman 1967).
The settlement policy and need to create jobs
were emphasized: “In view of the overcrowding in
the ‘wet zone’ and the prevailing high rate of
unemployment and underemployment, the project
will alleviate considerably the acute man/arable
land ratio and generate significant economic and
social benefits to the country” (ADB 1969). While
early settlements were centered on subsistence
and poverty reduction, the new project was
“production-oriented” and would erase traditional
farming systems. We have seen earlier what
became of these grand plans.
Despite the disquieting facts that
necessitated rehabilitation only 4 years after the
completion of the project, the proposal for
rehabilitation was packaged attractively; it was
“low cost and quick yielding” (disregarding earlier
costs). And it was “highly justifiable” because it
would remove “constraints which have inhibited
the full realization of benefits under the original
projects.” Since water management had failed to
distribute water evenly, the project would
“contribute to an increased and more equitable
income distribution among settlers in the project
area.”
The objectives of the rehabilitation were
easily shown to be in line with the government’s
sectoral development objectives: increasing
agricultural production, farm income and
employment opportunities in the project area. In
agreement with the then emphasis of
international agencies on turnover, cost recovery
and service provision, it was envisaged that
MASL would provide a “demand-driven advisory
service to farmers where farmer organizations
request assistance in support of self-defined
48See Hirschman (1967): “A specific gift of nature [must] be fully developed and utilized. The argument that a ‘free’ natural resource is
there waiting to be harnessed exerts a continuing attraction on engineers, politicians, and the public.”
49Employment was the most pressing issue in the implementation of the Mahaweli Project (Wickremaratne 1995).
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objectives.” The vision of subsidized, indebted
and hand-to-mouth peasants transmuted into
small entrepreneurs picking up and paying for
services, allowing them to achieve maximization
of production, is probably the most pervasive,
resilient and appealing Holy Grail of development
agencies. Unfortunately, if this vision helped
presenting projects in orderly, efficient and
attractive attires, it did not materialize in the
Walawe basin.
After 25 years of persistent dominance of
rice cultivation, conflicts in the selection of
settlers, and dismal efficiency of water
distribution, everything pointed toward a lull in
the pace of investment. The development of the
LB seemed unwarranted by the very high
amount of water used in the RB. The ADB
contested the opportunity to embrace a new
phase of development before management was
brought in line with acceptable standards. The
combined willingness of MASL and the Japanese
development agencies to pursue development,
however, prevailed. The new project did not
depart much, in its style, from earlier top-down,
engineer-oriented projects with design options,
settlement processes and economic feasibility
dependent upon assumptions of cropping
patterns, practices and productivity that had
been clearly proved ad hoc and unrealistic in the
past. The example of the intent to “change the
present nomadic system of cattle management
to a privately managed permanent holding
system” illustrates this point (Nippon Koei and
MASL 1995).
The feasibility study pointed to current
weaknesses of the Sri Lankan agriculture
sector—“inactive production of staple food with
decrease in its self-sufficiency,” low
diversification and decline in farm income—and
argued that one “cannot take an optimistic view
of the agricultural sector in the country unless an
effective programme would be implemented to
overcome the above constraints. The project has
various advantages over the agricultural
development in the dry zone and urgent
implementation is needed” (Nippon Koei and
MASL 1995). The necessity of agricultural
development was also stressed, based on the
situation of unemployment in the country and on
the “government’s poverty alleviation drive.” The
Southern Area Development Strategy was also
seen to reflect the government’s special concern
in the region.
In sum, the justifications given during four
decades were based on modernist principles that
echoed very general objectives of the
government: raising national production and rural
income, diversifying agriculture, alleviating
poverty and increasing employment. All projects
do this to a greater or lesser extent and, thus,
have easily fallen in line with general
government policies. As noted by Berkoff (2002),
“irrigation is so obviously a good thing—who can
be against it?”
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Economic
Rationale
Normative project planning assumes that
intervention decisions are taken based on a
ranking of their relative net benefits to society.
Over the past 50 years, the societal benefits of
large-scale public investments have been
typically measured using cost-benefit analysis
(CBA). Despite the longstanding controversy on
the legitimacy of CBA’s claim for objectivity (see
below), it is still widely used as a means to
assess both the desirability and degree of
success of projects. Decision-makers seek
projects where benefits exceed costs and the
economic internal rate of return (EIRR) is
adequate.50 The EIRR measures the return on
investment and a value of 10 percent is generally
considered as a threshold for “feasibility” on an a
priori basis and for “successfulness” on an ex
post basis. The necessity of projects to reach
such a target EIRR for funding consideration by
50The EIRR is the discount rate such that the discounted stream of benefits equals the discounted stream of costs; it measures return on
investment.
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bilateral and multilateral donors heavily impacts
on the assumptions consultants make, not only
about prices, yields or cropping patterns, but also
about water requirements and canal design. It
also impacts on what type of work or action is to
be deemed necessary.
The 1960 report by the Photographic Survey
Corporation (PSC and SGC 1960) had a grand
vision of the future of the basin. It recognized
that “it is difficult to evaluate the ultimate benefit
of this proposed irrigation and colonization
scheme to the national economy, but it would
certainly be very great.” The RVDB report of 1963
estimated costs at US$14.41 million and
computed expected optimistic revenues to come
from annual land rents (US$10.38/ha) and water
fees (US$2.60/ha) during 50 years, as well as
from the sale of electricity, to arrive at a cost-
benefit ratio of 1.94. The Hunting report (1968)
estimated the costs of the project at full
development at US$47.6 million and assessed
that “at maturity, the project, if successfully
implemented, will provide 12,000 farmers with
generous incomes” as well as “a substantial
return to capital invested.” The report, however,
fell short of calculating a cost-benefit ratio or an
EIRR. It also captured only a portion of actual
physical infrastructural costs.
In the 1969 ADB project assessment report,
a water charge of Rs 40/acre (US$16.6/ha) per
year was assumed (up from Rs 5/acre in the
earlier feasibility study). The BC ratio of the
project, including past investments (dams as
initial irrigation works) and benefits from
agricultural production and water and land fees,
was calculated at 1.1 (with a discount rate of
10% per year) and the EIRR reached 11.1
percent. The life of the project was taken as 40
years. The ADB also estimated the BC ratio and
EIRR ignoring earlier investment costs, which
yielded a rosier BC ratio of 1.7 and an EIRR of
16 percent that helped cast the project into a
more favorable light. The report also noted that
the project “will produce other direct and indirect
social and economic benefits, which will be
considerable but are difficult to quantify.”51
Ten years later, with a “newly” delivered
project already in a worrying state of degradation,
rehabilitation appeared inevitable. Cost-benefit
analyses were carried out for two assumptions—
one incorporated a portion of past investment and
the other ignored earlier costs. Both CBAs
included the full range of estimated benefits from
the project. Due to the adverse impact of delays
(10 years instead of 3), the elimination of two
tracts in the southernmost area, unrealized
“ambitious production targets,” and the increase in
costs, the EIRR dropped to 7 and 8 percent, for
the two assumptions, respectively. In addition,
the EIRRs would have been much lower without
the unexpected tripling of the price of rice since
donor appraisal (Nijman 1991). “Numerous
important non-quantifiable benefits” accruing to a
now “flourishing region with considerable progress
in various sectors” were also expected but no
effort was undertaken to estimate them.
The immediate rehabilitation of the RB project
area held the promise of lifting the EIRR to the
fatidic 10-percent level (or even to 35% if past
investment costs were not considered) if cropping
intensity was to increase from 134 to 185
percent. In the feasibility report, the CB ratio was
evaluated at 1.72 (with a 10% discount over 50
years) and the EIRR at 17.3 percent. These
estimates appear to ignore sunk costs and, as a
result, the project was necessarily “low cost and
quick yielding.” Nijman (1991) reported that
several sound options, such as forming water-
user groups, raising the dam of the Uda Walawe
reservoir by one meter and rehabilitating small
tanks, were discarded because of their negative
impact on the EIRR.52
The ADB’s project performance audit of the
RB rehabilitation in 1999 noted with satisfaction
51Detailed information contained in an appendix to the report also stated that in both cases costs for main roads and 50 percent of the costs
for townships and villages were excluded because they would be built anyway.
52They raised the costs without raising the benefits, which were already derived from the most optimistic hypothesis.
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the expansion of banana cultivation and its US$9
million of yearly gross product “making the project
the leading production area in the country,” while
rice yield (5 t/ha) also featured as one of the
highest in the country. These results raised the
EIRR of rehabilitation to 11.3 percent (assuming
the first phase of the project was treated as sunk
costs) and the project was therefore classified as
“successful.” On the other hand, while banana
had successfully restored the EIRR of the
project, it was noted that the sustainability of this
EIRR was threatened by a possible decline in the
price of banana resulting from increased
production associated with expansion of the area
under cultivation. For example, a reduction of 20
percent in banana prices would reduce the EIRR
to 9.2 percent.
The review of the feasibility study of the
extension of the LB area carried out in 1995 by
Nippon Koei included several changes with
regard to the 1993 pre-feasibility report.
Sugarcane, expected to grow on 3,000 ha, was
substituted with banana, onion and vegetables,
which yielded much better returns. Water supply,
which the ADB considered as insufficient to
warrant the development of the last phase under
the then management practices, was considered
to be secured by both the Samanala reservoir
and the diversion from the Timbolketiya river.53
Although the 1995 revised feasibility study by
Nippon Koei increased the estimated cost of the
project from US$107 million (Rs 5.5 billion) in
the 1993 report to US$141 million (Rs 7.2
billion), they estimated the EIRR at 17.8 percent.
EIRRs are routinely churned out to justify
investment projects that are often decided on
totally different grounds, although most
economists readily admit that the categories of
cost, benefit, project lifetime, etc. can be
manipulated to obtain very contrasting results
(Ingram 1971). While some acknowledge that the
CBA is easily “corrupted,” others consider the
variability of the results as a product of
incompetence or bias, not a weakness of the
method (Williams 1972). Yet others present more
philosophical objections to the idea that values
and preferences could be commensurate and
could be reduced to a single number.54 The EIRR
undoubtedly suits bureaucratic processes of
decision making, which are unable to deal with
complexity and need to base decisions on
assumedly neutral and objective criteria. It
provides scientific support and legitimization, and
may serve as a powerful tool “to clothe politically
desirable projects in the fig leaf of economic
respectability” (Marshall 1965). Despite these
alleged limitations and manipulations, CBA
allows one to identify and weed out projects that
are absurd from an economic point of view
(Ingram 1997).
Porter’s (1995) study of the history of CBA
at the US Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
unearthed more subtle dimensions of the
technique. Quantitative techniques provide a
sense of “mechanical objectivity” that seems to
override the passions and interests that inform
political debate. But they are also driven by the
rivalry between administrations (in Porter’s work,
between the US Department of Agriculture, the
Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps), which
provide incentives to seek a single standardized
method of the CBA.55 In regard to the Corps,
Porter shows that “as the best harbors were
developed, levees erected and dam sites used
up, more and more of these so-called intangible
benefits were made tangible, and quantified. In
consequence, many projects that were turned
down, some decisively, in the 1940s or 1950s
were eventually approved and built.” In other
words, “the Corps was engaged in a perpetual
53While the MMP study of 1993 found that the Samanala reservoir would slightly decrease the frequency of deficit in the Walawe system, a
feasibility study 2 years later arrives at the opposite conclusion.
54For further discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of CBA, a subject of extensive literature, see Porter 1994; Kopp et al. 1997, and
Lohman 1997.
55This attempt was largely unsuccessful, as each administration continued to incorporate its own interests and viewpoints in the techniques
it used.
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effort to push back the frontiers of cost-benefit
analysis so that there would always be a
manageable supply of economically approved
projects.” As early as the 1940s, this led the
Corps to consider five classes of “extended
benefits radiating outward” categorized as
merchandizing, direct processing, other stages of
processing, wholesale trade and retail trade.
This stands in marked contrast to the
crudeness of the CBAs carried out by successive
consultants or by the ADB for UWIRP. Wishful
hypotheses were made without much necessity
being felt to justify them; the project lifetime was
taken as 50 years despite rehabilitation starting 4
years after completion, and it had unrealistic
cropping patterns aimed at boosting benefits, ad
hoc estimates of future irrigation efficiency and
infeasible cost-recovery scenarios. The EIRRs for
the rehabilitation phase were based on costs only
for the rehabilitation rather than the entire
investment as a way to enhance the benefits of
the proposed rehabilitation. In sum, while the
bureaucratic necessity to raise the EIRR to 10
percent was influencing the way the CBA was
carried out, the reports were quite liberal with
parameters and did not show pressure to produce
“harder” results. Significantly, derived benefits, in
particular the generation of job opportunities, were
mentioned in passing and there was no
quantification. In other words, there was no sign
of the “accounting inventiveness” of the Bureau of
Reclamation (Porter 1995). A tentative explanation
for this difference is given below.
Cost Recovery
Cost recovery is an important component of the
policy of development banks. It is seen not only
as a means to ensure sustainability, by providing
financial resources for maintenance, but also as
a way to instill a sense of ownership, as well as
responsibility with regard to water-management
practices. It is also vaguely assumed that making
farmers pay for water might be conducive to
limiting water wastage. In practice, discussions
on farmers paying for water are about recovering
part of the costs incurred by the project for the
government coffers.
The ECI report in 1960 did not elaborate
much on financial issues but endorsed the
principle of water charges as a key element of
the project: “experience in irrigated areas in
other parts of the world has shown that the
control of water distribution and the elimination
of waste in irrigation depend as much on the
levying of a water charge or tax as on any other
factor.” In a probable reference to colonial times
or to some western countries,56 the report says
that charging for water “not only brings in
revenue, but in many countries has also proved
to be an efficient means of bringing into being
and maintaining a desired land-use pattern.”
In the RVDB report of 1963, revenues from
land rent, water fees, and the sale of electricity
during 50 years were supposed to balance part
of the investment costs. The concern for cost
recovery was also present from the start in the
1968 Hunting report, which emphasized that “an
important objective of the Walawe plan is that
farmers should pay for certain services and
facilities provided to them.” Since fee recovery
was admittedly difficult to ensure, repayment
should be “insisted on from the earliest
opportunity as a pre-condition to the grant of
title.”
The 1969 ADB appraisal report proposes to
recover costs in the order of US$1,680 per 2-
hectare farm (Rs 10,000 per 5-acre farm) over a
period of 25 years, which could be considered
as “a considerable improvement compared to the
present practice under which farmers pay only a
56The report shows a clear tendency—posing no problem at that time—to confuse contexts and to export issues and problems more familiar
to northern America to developing countries. For example: “there is no water act in Ceylon defining the rights and limits applying to water
users. It is assumed that existing developments would be given a prior right to the use of water. These rights should be evaluated by the
legal authorities, and an attempt should be made to determine how they may affect the economic evaluation of new projects, such as the
one suggested for the lowland plain of the Walawe basin.” The issue was brought back by the ADB 1999 report, almost 40 years later,
without a much clearer idea on how it could be put into practice.
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nominal rent of Rs 20 per acre per year.” The
government also “intends to collect a water
charge of Rs 40 per irrigated acre a year from
settlers in the project area. This water charge will
be reviewed in the fifth year when farmers are
expected to realize more fully the benefits from
the project. At that time, consideration will be
given not only to maintenance and operating
costs, but also to recovery of the development
costs” (ADB 1969).
These intentions, however, would never be
realized. Facing numerous and severe difficulties
in the settlement process, as well as in the
implementation of the construction work, the
RVDB was obviously not keen to open a new
front on such a sensitive issue.
With the dismal evidence of the rapidity of
degradation, the ADB understandingly placed
emphasis on cost recovery in the negotiations
for rehabilitation. The government explicitly
endorsed the principle of O&M cost recovery in
the National Agriculture, Food and Nutrition
Strategy and, in July 1983, issued the Irrigation
Ordinance (amendment), which required the levy
of Rs 100 per acre (US$10.50 per hectare)
annually on gravity irrigation systems, effective
April 1984. “This rate represented about 50
percent of average O&M costs on a country-
wide basis. The government intention is to
review this rate periodically and increase it at 20
percent per annum so as to attain full O&M cost
recovery by 1989” (ADB 1984). With initial
collection efficiency in the project area at more
than 50 percent, the new policy seemed to
receive adequate support from the government
and contented the Bank.
The ADB mission also obtained “suitable
assurances” from the government that it would,
in consultation with the ADB, introduce variable
irrigation fees for rice and upland crops to
encourage crop diversification, and report
regularly on the progress of the fee collection
and on improvements in the collection
mechanism. Because “subsidies for operation
and maintenance costs of the irrigation system
constitute a heavy burden on the government
budget... the government has decided to phase
out irrigation subsidies gradually by recovering
the O&M costs from the beneficiaries of the
irrigation system” (ADB 1984).
It may be revealing that none of the
subsequent reports by MMP or the 1995
Project Completion Report commented on what
happened to fee collection.57 The report
emphasized not only the need to strengthen
farmer organizations but also the “need to
consider financial incentives to encourage
farmers to make efficient use of water. One
means of doing so is to build on the proposal to
issue bulk deliveries of water to distributary canal
organizations for onward sale to field canal
groups. This would raise the farmers’ awareness
of the cost of water, as well as generating
revenue for maintenance and for the salary of
farmer representatives and any gate operators.”
Nothing was said about how such policy
might be implemented, why the earlier collection
failed, and how the general rhetoric on the
benefits of water pricing might apply to the
particular context of Walawe where volumetric
pricing was a far-fetched option. In addition, the
report also envisioned that “over the next five
years, farmer organizations [were] expected to
take over the full costs of maintaining distributary
and field canals.”
The 1999 post-evaluation report lightly
touched upon the issue, and built upon the idea
of volumetric pricing, adding a reference to water
rights:
“While full economic pricing will not
be feasible for the foreseeable future, the
same objective could largely be achieved
through the allocation of transferable
water rights, with areas with surplus
encouraged to sell their excess rights to
deficit areas. Transferability of water on a
voluntary and compensated [sic] basis
57Fee collection was started but discontinued after 4 years because of widespread defaulting and vocal opposition from farmers. See Samad
et al, Forthcoming.
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will be a major tool to promote more
efficient allocation and use of water
resources” (ADB 1999a).
While such mechanisms are known to be
useful and powerful tools in certain contexts of
scarcity, notably in times of crisis (e.g., the
drought bank in California), they are also known
to demand that a set of drastic conditions be in
place for them to function (Molle 2004). Such
suggestions in the Sri Lankan context are
inappropriate for the time being and illustrate
how outsiders’ mind-sets and blueprints are
sometimes projected into utterly different
contexts.
Water Requirements: Supply, Demand
and Management
Because of its importance to project
management and adequateness of supply to
farmers, it is instructive to insert here a comment
on the malleability of supposedly fixed project
parameters, taking as an example the loss of
water by percolation in irrigated fields. Water duty,
or the amount of irrigation water planned for one
unit of land, as considered in project design, is
often believed to be an unambiguous parameter
that can be easily derived from sound technical
parameters on crop physiology and soil types, as
textbooks indicate. In reality, crop water
requirements are calculated based on data with a
significant level of uncertainty and, above all,
high spatial and temporal heterogeneity (e.g., soil
characteristics and management practices).
The design values of water duties are of
crucial importance since they dictate the
capacity of the canals to be built and, thus, have
a critical bearing on project costs and the
resulting cost-benefit ratios. In what follows, we
look at how assumptions on water requirements
have changed over time and the resulting
impacts on project design, management and
economic profitability.
The study by IEC in 1954 considered a total
water requirement of 8 feet (2.44 m) for two
crops of rice, based on past experiences in
similar areas, while the Irrigation Department
estimate was 10.5 feet or 3.20 m (IEC 1954). The
ECI report, in 1960, investigated the capacity of
the future Uda Walawe dam and apparently
discovered the 10 feet (3.05 m) yearly water
requirement mentioned in the Tender Notice data.
Such a high figure was incompatible with the
projected irrigated area (110,000 acres or 44,515
ha) and the storage capacity offered by the site
envisaged. A study (“The Samanala Wewa
Project Report”) was opportunely reported to
propose a value of 4 feet (1.22 m) per year that
was eventually selected by ECI “as a sound
representation of the average overall conditions
for the farm water needs.”
The 1968 Hunting report puts its faith in
modern management, which will allow
requirements for rice to be half the water used
“under the traditional system of virtually unlimited
irrigation.” The farm-level irrigation water
requirement is taken as 4.2 feet (1.28 m) per
year; “this is considerably less than the design
requirement used for the alienated rice areas in
the Uda Walawe area, but will be sufficient if
correct principles of water use are fully
understood by engineers and farmers alike” (HTS
1968a). Consequently, water is found “to be in
surplus above requirements and an additional
12,000 acres of accessible highland is proposed
to be brought under lift irrigation.” Design is not
adapted to reality but, rather, reality is expected
to fall in line with “correct principles.”
The Government Plan (GOC 1969) revised
these values and assumed a crop water need of
5.5 feet (1.68 m), plus 40 percent conveyance
loss, giving a total water duty for rice of 7.7 feet
(2.35 m). The 1969 ADB Appraisal Report is not
much concerned about water issues, an
understandable attitude since the project is
about the construction of the RB only. In 1979,
the Project Completion Report finds out “that
only about 70 per cent of the RB area
envisioned for irrigation at the time of appraisal
is actually served, and this area is consuming
about three times the water proposed for the
entire RB area.” A poor design and operation,
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added to widespread physical degradation,
deprived many tail-end areas of water.
Indeed, the reports by PRC (1982), Wolf
(1983) and SOGREAH (1984) give more attention
to water management. It is now recognized that
percolation losses are very high in RBE soils and
Wolf takes them at 4 mm per day. SOGREAH
assumes average infiltration loss in rice fields to
be 3 mm per day and states that “5 mm/day is
probably the maximum unavoidable loss on
sloping land,” seemingly ignoring that many plots
dry up in one day. A dilemma occurs in that it is
impossible to plan an increase in cropping area in
the project without drastically reducing this
number. SOGREAH, therefore, envisions four
types of water-saving measures, which constitute
optimistic if not wishful ad hoc hypotheses.
Faced with the duty to implement the
rehabilitation works based on new design
parameters, MMP’s (1986) inception report
identifies effective rainfall and deep percolation as
critical factors, and stresses the absence of field
measurement of actual losses. The percolation
rate is taken as 5 mm/day and tests are advised
but later reports do not indicate whether these
have been carried out or not. Two years later,
calculations of operational procedures appear to
have been made based on a general assumption
of 5 mm per day infiltration losses (MMP 1988).
Oddly enough, the cropping patterns considered
are not the actual ones and include many more
OFCs than is the case in reality. The report
indicates that “it is not suggested that the
[cropping] pattern… will in practice be adopted by
the farmers” but it is meant to “provide a
practicable method for planning an equitable
distribution of water… the farmers will then adapt
their irrigation and cropping to match the available
water within the specific constraints of the soils
and topography, their farming practices and the
conditions of their individual farms” (MMP 1988).
The rotations calculated and proposed are
therefore not meant to correspond to actual
cropping patterns but, by incorporating some
constraint in supply, are expected to force
adjustments by farmers. A different possible
outcome, of course, is that farmers will employ
illegal means and damage infrastructures to
access water. Last, MMP’s (1992) handbook
issued at the end of the project does not
comment on the issue. The tables given to
calculate water duties by canal, however,
consider high values of deep percolation for tracts
2, 3 and 4, that is, the very upper part of the
scheme (see map in Appendix B), while keeping
a value of 5 mm/day for the rest of the area.58
The feasibility study on the Walawe extension
project (JICA 1993) addresses the issue of
percolation loss more seriously. At last,
systematic infiltration tests were carried out and
yielded rates of 5, 10 and 20 mm per day for
LHG, RBE (moderate drainage) and RBE (well-
drained) soils, respectively. This gave water
duties that are between 2 and 8 times those
considered by Hunting in 1968. By investigating
the spatial variability of percolation losses, JICA
opened the Pandora’s box and found out
extremely high plot water requirements that have
the potential to jeopardize any attempt to add
the extension area to the existing scheme.
Subsequent generous hypotheses on field
application losses and water reuse were then
formulated to counterbalance this finding and
reduce diversion requirements.
What this brief retrospective tells us is that
the assessment of water requirements is both a
touchy technical issue and one that governs the
most crucial design parameters of the project as
well as the assessment of its economic
performance. The most astonishing observation
is the range of variation of water duties, from 4.2
to 15 feet (1.28-4.57 m) per year (let alone the
36 feet or 11 m for well drained RBE soils found
by JICA). It is also apparent that for 50 years
consultants have avoided carrying out systematic
percolation tests, until those undertaken by JICA
in 1993. On the contrary, it appears that
assumptions on water use have been largely
58It can be hypothesized that MMP’s earlier policy to consider losses of 5 mm/day and idealized cropping patterns was eventually judged
too hazardous for the upper block, where losses are highest. We don’t have the records needed to fully analyze how MMP eventually struck
a balance between what was technically/financially possible and the implications of considering the real values of percolation losses.
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taken as given, based on historical reports,
inferred, or “retro-estimated,” based on the
potential defined by the dam capacity and the
corresponding irrigable area under its command.
For example, ECI used comparisons with the
United States. Hunting backed its water duties
by arguing that modern management would halve
the water use of “traditional agriculture.”
SOGREAH envisioned the wholesale adoption of
four ad hoc water conservation measures. ADB
(1969) and MMP (1986) assumed cropping
patterns that involved more area in OFCs than
could be realistically anticipated, and JICA
(1993) minimized the implication of its own
findings on percolation by adopting generous
hypotheses on the rate of water reuse.
This “inventiveness” is no surprise for those
who have been involved in project design.
However, just as in the case of CBA,
consultants cannot be fully blamed for their
“adaptive” behavior. They are requested by the
funding agencies to arrive at results that are by
and large predefined by general targets and
specific constraints. They must abide by the
policy guidelines, avoid antagonizing
management agencies and other officials, and
must cast the project of their contracting agency
in a favorable light. Just as in the case of CBA,
it appears that the range of hypotheses that one
can make on the numerous parameters of the
project is extremely large and malleable, and
that their impact on the EIRR can be surprisingly
large (Williams 1972).
There is little scrutiny of and objections to
the choices made. “Who is to say the
assumptions are wrong?” asks Berkoff (2002). A
collateral effect of such logic, however, is of
extreme importance. When structures are
designed based on unrealistically optimistic water
duties, it creates an environment of future water
scarcity that ultimately become inscribed in the
physical landscape and on those who depend
upon it. Hydraulic units and subunits will not get
the amount of water they need and users will be
led to tamper with or destroy structures. The
resulting decay, ascribed to farmers’ indiscipline,
tampering of structures and poor management, is
partly a consequence of the earlier “tampering” of
technical parameters.
Actors’ Interests and Strategies
This section attempts to wrap up the different
observations made earlier and to highlight how
the combined strategies of the various
“stakeholders” may result in the sequence of
events described earlier. These stakeholders
include multilateral funding agencies, the central
government, local politicians (district and
provincial), the implementing agencies, the
international or national consultants and the
“affected populations” (see table 9). The actions
of stakeholders are determined, in part, by their
role in the project, their particular interests,
accountability and potential sanctions.
One of the most striking features of proposed
development projects—especially one that does
not involve land reclamation or resettlement—is
the convergence of interests around the project.
Development banks need to lend money and their
representatives are partly evaluated on the
amount of funds they have lent. The central
government, particularly the Ministry of Finance,
is traditionally more cautious about spending
money, but the relatively advantageous conditions
of such loans plus the pressure felt by the
government to deliver public goods and to
legitimize its actions by taking up the
“development mission” make the option attractive
or, at least, minimize opposition. This fosters an
attitude of “getting the capital funds while you
can, worrying about the use of the resulting
project later, if at all” (Howe and Dixon 1993).
Local politicians, especially those linked to the
party in charge, hope to benefit through patronage
and obviously add their pressure to the demand
for investments. Implementing agencies, in turn,
are eager to sustain the flow of resources that
strengthens their power and soothes recurrent
financial difficulties, particularly with regard to
O&M. National and international consulting firms
seek project work opportunities, to respond to the
objectives of their clients, and to benefit from
48
TA
B
LE
 9
.
M
ai
n 
ac
to
rs
 in
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t p
ro
ce
ss
 a
nd
 th
ei
r 
re
sp
ec
tiv
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
.
A
ct
or
R
ol
e
P
ar
tic
ul
ar
 i
nt
er
es
ts
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
P
os
si
bl
e 
sa
nc
tio
n
C
en
tr
al
C
en
tr
al
 p
la
nn
er
: 
S
et
 p
ro
je
ct
C
re
at
e 
re
gi
on
al
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t;
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
le
 t
o 
so
ci
et
y/
Lo
ss
 o
f 
po
w
er
/lo
ss
 o
f
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
ob
je
ct
iv
es
, 
pl
an
 r
eg
io
na
l
st
re
ng
th
en
 p
ol
iti
ca
l l
eg
iti
m
ac
y
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 f
un
di
ng
fu
tu
re
 f
un
di
ng
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
an
d 
lo
ca
l p
ar
ty
 m
em
be
rs
;
ag
en
ci
es
de
si
re
 f
or
 p
re
st
ig
e
Lo
ca
l 
po
lit
ic
ia
ns
Lo
bb
yi
ng
: 
S
up
po
rt
 f
ur
th
er
S
tr
en
gt
he
n 
po
lit
ic
al
 b
as
is
In
 p
rin
ci
pl
e,
 t
o 
pe
op
le
;
N
on
-r
ee
le
ct
io
n
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 a
nd
 l
oc
al
th
ro
ug
h 
pa
tr
on
ag
e
in
 r
ea
lit
y,
 l
itt
le
 a
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
pu
bl
ic
 i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l/
Te
ch
no
cr
at
: 
Id
en
tif
y 
pl
an
s 
to
 m
ee
t
A
cc
ep
ta
nc
e 
of
 p
ro
je
ct
; 
fu
rt
he
r 
ro
le
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
le
 t
o 
ce
nt
ra
l
Lo
ss
 o
f 
fu
tu
re
 w
or
k
lo
ca
l 
co
ns
ul
ta
nt
s
ob
je
ct
iv
es
, 
en
su
re
 t
ec
hn
ic
al
/e
co
no
m
ic
in
 d
es
ig
n 
or
 i
m
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n;
 c
om
pl
yi
ng
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
fe
as
ib
ili
ty
, 
ca
rr
y 
ou
t 
pl
an
s
w
ith
 f
un
di
ng
 a
ge
nc
y 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
Lo
ca
l
Te
ch
no
cr
at
: 
Id
en
tif
y 
pl
an
s 
to
 m
ee
t
S
us
ta
in
 t
he
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
bu
dg
et
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
le
 t
o 
ce
nt
ra
l
Lo
ss
 o
f 
po
w
er
im
pl
em
en
tin
g
ob
je
ct
iv
es
, 
en
su
re
 t
ec
hn
ic
al
/e
co
no
m
ic
at
tr
ib
ut
ed
 t
o 
it;
 j
us
tif
y 
ex
is
te
nc
e 
an
d
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
ag
en
ci
es
fe
as
ib
ili
ty
, 
ca
rr
y 
ou
t 
pl
an
s
st
af
fin
g;
 s
tr
en
gt
he
 b
ur
ea
uc
ra
tic
 p
ow
er
M
ul
til
at
er
al
P
la
nn
er
/te
ch
no
cr
at
: 
H
el
p 
id
en
tif
y 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
Le
nd
in
g 
m
on
ey
; 
se
le
ct
 p
ro
je
ct
 w
ith
 E
IR
R
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
le
 t
o 
se
lf
Lo
ss
 o
f 
cr
ed
ib
ili
ty
 i
f
fu
nd
in
g
go
al
s 
vi
a 
se
ct
or
al
 p
la
nn
in
g,
 i
de
nt
ify
 p
la
ns
 t
o 
m
ee
t
ab
ov
e 
10
 p
er
ce
nt
 a
nd
 i
nc
re
as
in
g 
co
st
(a
nd
 p
ar
tly
 t
o 
m
em
be
r
pr
oj
ec
t 
is
 a
 s
ev
er
e
ag
en
ci
es
ob
je
ct
iv
es
, 
pr
ov
id
e 
fu
nd
in
g 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
te
ch
ni
ca
l
re
co
ve
ry
; 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
of
 a
 m
ar
ke
t-
ec
on
om
y;
 c
ou
nt
rie
s)
fa
ilu
re
as
si
st
an
ce
su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
A
ff
ec
te
d
La
rg
el
y 
pa
ss
iv
e:
 c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 p
la
nn
in
g
To
 b
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 a
s 
a 
se
ttl
er
, 
or
 f
or
ci
ng
Lo
os
el
y 
ac
co
un
ta
bl
e 
to
Lo
ss
 o
f 
su
bs
id
ie
s;
po
pu
la
tio
n
ob
je
ct
iv
es
, 
lit
tle
 s
ay
 i
n 
pl
an
ni
ng
 a
nd
de
ci
si
on
 t
hr
ou
gh
 e
nc
ro
ac
hm
en
t;
lo
ca
l 
im
pl
em
en
tin
g 
ag
en
cy
de
gr
ad
at
io
n 
of
 f
ac
ili
tie
s;
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
ri
sk
 a
ve
rs
io
n
no
ns
el
ec
tio
n
49
further contracts. The concerned populations,
which are by no means homogeneous in either
their a priori socioeconomic status or their
potential to gain or lose as a result of the project,
tend to welcome the project if they see direct
benefit for their families.
Some minor groups, however, stand to lose,
but they are hardly organized to a level that could
significantly influence the course of things. In
some cases, such as the purana villagers under
the Chandrikawewa reservoir who were successful
in keeping their larger plots of land, succeeded in
preserving their interests. In other instances, this
is not the case. As we have seen earlier, the
population making a living off the shrimp in the
brackish lagoon lost their livelihood when irrigation
drainage reduced the salinity of brackish water
and decimated indigenous shrimp populations.
The expansion of irrigated areas or “state
enclosures” such as national parks or
afforestation areas have also reduced the space
available to indigenous chena cultivators and
cattle farmers. The “nomadic” cattle owners of the
LB are also likely to lose most of their grazing
lands as development in the area continues.
Chena cultivators are likely to be absorbed as
settlers and since chena is deemed illegal most
of the time, they also have little scope for
opposition.
Notwithstanding these third-party impacts,
which are at best mentioned in passing in the
different project reports, UWIRP is characterized
by a convergence of interests. Basically, all
actors in the process have a strong interest in
making it happen. Sanction in case of failure also
appears to be very low. The evidence that,
irrespective of its outcome, the project will
increase the debt burden of the country is not a
serious deterrent, as politicians struggle for
reelection. Politics tends to be pervaded with a
short-term “after me the deluge” attitude.
Consultants give priority to respond to the donors’
objectives and are ready, for example, to
incorporate cost-recovery mechanisms that suit a
particular bank’s general policies, ad hoc cropping
patterns or irrigation efficiencies that make the
project more profitable, irrespective of whether
they think these are realistic or not. If the
assumptions made are not realized, failures are
often blamed on the shortcomings in
implementation, inadequate maintenance, poor
performance of water-user groups and non-
adherence to proposed cropping patterns.
Responsibility for unrealistic targets set at
appraisal is avoided by deeming them as
“ambitious” rather than unfeasible.
Despite significant improvements in
infrastructure after rehabilitation, national planners
and managers have failed to boost project
performance. This poor performance was due to
the rapid turnover of Resident Project Manager,
low accountability towards users, deferred
maintenance, incapacity to ensure adequate
supply to the tail-end areas despite very high
supply-demand ratios, lack of incentives to
managers for improved performance, limited
consultation with users and reluctance to co-
manage the scheme. However, management in a
context of dilapidated infrastructure, poor
communication and transportation means, and
occasional political meddling is not an easy task.
Local politicians, indeed, have partly captured
project benefits through patronistic practices in
the designation and choice of settlers, and
sometimes through their intervention power and
capacity to influence spatial allocation of water
according to their needs.
In the 1960s and 1970s, multilateral
development banks like the World Bank and the
ADB pressed countries to present “development
plans replete with dirigiste policies and lists of
projects to be financed” (Roberts 2004). They run
little risk of being sanctioned by defaulting
clients, since their peculiar status entails that
they are assured of reimbursement. This fosters
a supply-oriented logic of disbursement
encouraged by incentives for country managers to
maximize loans (George and Sabelli 1993). These
institutions are thus tempted to indulge in wishful
thinking and to idealize the context in which the
project is being developed. The RVDB, for
example, is conveniently considered to have
undergone “considerable changes in its
organizational structure” and is fit to “promote
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successful implementation of the multi-purpose
Walawe scheme.” The ADB also tends to content
itself with the assurances given by the
government, knowing that political changes or
even their evident impracticability, often reduce
such commitments to dead letters, as the
example of cost recovery has clearly illustrated.59
The ADB has also demonstrated exaggerated
faith in the power of the state to reorder social
settings. The evidence of degradation of
infrastructure prompted the injunction that “a
decisive halt needs to be brought to the
deliberate destruction of project facilities. MASL
needs to prosecute culprits to stop such
practices from further developing and solemnly
warn farmers that their area will be shut off from
water delivery if further destruction takes place or
if they do not repair the damaged structure.” The
crucial role of the implementing agency seemed
to come to the fore only in the ADB’s 1999 ex
post project assessment report, where it is
recognized that “for the participatory approach to
work, it is essential that MASL forcefully backs it
and be fully committed to implement it over the
long term. This requires attitudinal and behavioral
changes from the top to the bottom of the
institution.” In 1999, all the recipes of the day are
potentially ready to put things back on the right
track: “key issues that the policy could address
include the development of effective O&M
systems, water-right transferability and pricing.
Urgent priority must be given to strengthening
FOs [the funding of which had been disregarded
10 years earlier] if further decline of Walawe’s
irrigation system is to be prevented” (ADB
1999b). The report concluded with a pessimistic
undertone, “it is not too late to redeem the
situation,” revealing some frustration with the
stubborn resistance of projects to conform to
idealized images.
The reputation of development banks,
however, may suffer from outright project failures.
To avoid such situations, banks sometimes get
caught up in avoidable successive phases of
rehabilitation or modernization. This is clear in the
present case study, where rehabilitation was
aimed at “realizing the benefits” of the preceding
project; that is, fixing up the failures of a project
by dubbing previous failures or shortcomings as
“constraints.” Since the interest of the ADB for
rehabilitation exceeded that of the central
government, a telling shift in the relative shares
of funding occurred, with the ADB funding 80
percent of the rehabilitation phase, against 26
percent of the construction phase. In addition, the
Bank used the leverage of possible loans to the
nearby Kirindi Oya Project to put pressure on the
government to accept the rehabilitation (Nijman
1991). Getting the EIRR back to 10 percent was
a manifest concern of the Bank, even if the
arithmetic involved might have been contested.
The point, indeed, is that except for the
internal review at the Bank itself, nobody seems
to have scrutinized or questioned the hypotheses
and calculations made, or felt the need to test the
sensitivity of parameters or to include a broader
definition of benefits and costs. While Porter
attributed the development of the CBA in the USA
to bureaucratic conflict in a context of
overwhelming public distrust, the situation in the
USA is clearly at odds with that of the Walawe
basin. First, loans are largely coming from
multilateral development banks and this type of
funding is subject to much less internal
competition or objection than the use of
government coffers. Second, public scrutiny,
participation or alternative viewpoints were almost
negligible in the process, diminishing the pressure
to justify investments, particularly to present
alternative use of the funds, or to address third-
party impacts. The absence of “accounting
inventiveness” in the bank and consultant reports
is striking and reflects the lack of accountability,
and the lack of scrutiny by outsiders. A more
sophisticated CBA would be possible but would
come at a cost, and there is obviously no
incentive to embark in such an exercise since
most parties have converging interests and do not
dispute the case. No costly models or surveys
are required to make the case.
59“The government has given assurance that problems of land titling will be solved and that policies of free market, subsidy reduction
on agricultural inputs, and price support will continue,” etc.
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This consensus, however, was broken in the
1990s, when ADB did not support further
development of the irrigation area, based on the
evidence that the lack of improvement in water
management and irrigation efficiency did not allow
expansion of the system.60 The government and
MASL successfully resorted to alternative
sources of funding, by approaching the Japanese
Bank for International Cooperation and other
funding agencies. As they were not involved in
the earlier frustrating phase of development, the
Japanese institutions were receptive to the
request and conducted pre-feasibility and
feasibility studies, adjusting hypotheses to
produce an attractive project outlook and EIRRs.
This shows that competition between lending
agencies can be adequately exploited to further
development (Howe and Dixon 1993), even when
particular circumstances have drastically
dampened the enthusiasm of a particular lender.
In sum, if we follow Ingram (1971), who
states that “the inclusion of a particular project in
a package depends upon its effect on the
balance of support and opposition to the package,
not the relationship of the project to any aims or
goals established for water management in
general or for the particular collection of projects,”
then the “Walawe Package” appears as the
natural outcome of contributing and converging
interests faced with little or no opposition, and
subject to little scrutiny. This should not be taken
as a criticism of poor or faulty planning, although
some elements were clearly unrealistic. Rather,
we suggest that government interventions are
almost invariably based on overarching policies or
political priorities that come with strong self-
justificatory undertones and that largely override
formal cost-benefit analysis. This has been widely
observed in both developing and developed
countries (del Moral et al. 2003). Irrespective of
whether the priorities defined are sound or not,
the convergence of interests leads to
choreographed cycles of project appraisal, design,
implementation and assessments that unfold
under the banner of rational planning and
computed outcomes.
Lessons Learned and Conclusions
This comprehensive analysis of the Uda Walawe
Irrigation and Resettlement project in Southern Sri
Lanka has led us to look at its successive
development phases through different lenses.
The main point coming out of the
description of over 50 years of progressive
development is the wide range of difficulties
that have constantly undermined the efforts
made. They range from design failure, shoddy
construction and poor maintenance to
constraints on agricultural diversification,
administrative inertia and political upheavals.
What is striking is the contrast between the
(sometimes blunt) assuredness of the
hypotheses made in feasibility reports and the
reality on the ground, between the simplistic
technological and social engineering drive of
the consultants and the complexity of regional
development.
As a result, expectedly, the different
performance indicators or, more simply, the
comparison between expected and observed
results of the different phases, reveal significant
discrepancies. These discrepancies confirm the
more general results found by various other
studies on project performance.
60The 1999 ADB report states: “If supplies prove to be inadequate, decisions will be required by MASL on necessary changes to the
design or phasing of expansion area development. It is suggested that MASL considers suspension of development of the LB
expansion area.”
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The review of direct costs and benefits
showed that crop benefits remained quite
depressed until the groundswell of banana
cultivation, which came to occupy around 40
percent of the command area. It also shows how
the price of agricultural products eventually
dictated the profitability of the project. While a
full-fledged assessment of all direct and indirect
benefits and negative externalities was not
attempted, the estimation of the value of other
water-related benefits such as inland fisheries,
the National Park, and home-garden produce
showed that many important components need to
be considered for a more comprehensive impact
assessment.
The justifications of project development
during four decades were based on modernist
principles that echoed very general objectives of
the government—raising national production and
rural income, diversifying agriculture, alleviating
poverty and increasing employment. All projects
do this to a greater or lesser extent and they
were easily shown to be consistent with general
government policies. When presented as
unquestionable necessities, national priorities can
override benefit-cost ratios that are not sufficient
to justify the project; they can also obviate the
need to investigate in more depth the diversity of
possible positive and negative impacts.
Indeed, cost-benefit analyses, as appearing in
consultants’ reports, were found to be confined to
the estimation of crop-related direct costs and
benefits and showed little of the sophistication
that has emerged in contexts where substantial
scrutiny and competition for resources are the
rule. Assumptions on percolation losses, water
requirements, cropping patterns, or management
efficiency were partly made under the constraint
to obtain an EIRR of over 10 percent. The case
of the estimation of percolation losses was
illustrative of the “malleability” of project
parameters but it also showed the dramatic
consequences on water management and
infrastructure degradation that unrealistic
assumptions made on paper may have on the
ground.
The crude nature of cost-benefit analysis is
also commonplace and might lead to the usual
prescription that such analysis should be carried
out in a more thorough manner. However, if cost-
benefit analysis does have a role in eliminating
“dead duck” projects and contributing to better
choices (Green 2003) it must be recognized that
social choice is eventually governed by a much
wider array of considerations than mere financial
calculations.
Finally, the history of UWIRP was examined
from the perspective of a set of actors with their
respective interests, constraints and strategies.
These actors include the central government,
local politicians, international and local
consultants, local implementing agencies,
multilateral funding agencies and affected
populations. The case of UWIRP is notable by
the convergence of interests to make the project
happen; there was little apparent resistance to
UWIRP. Accountability and sanction for failure of
the different actors were found to be low or
nonexistent. As a result, the unfolding of the
project was very much driven by the agenda of
those in control of financial resources (the state
and lending agencies), with a bearing on stated
priorities, project options (e.g., decision to
rehabilitate), and the responses found by
consultants to fulfill their expectations.
The ongoing gap between the rationality of
these actors and the events on the ground,
between planning and the combined behaviors of
local managers and users, cannot be understood
solely on the basis of poor performance or non-
adherence to rules and plans. The trajectory of a
project like UWIRP may be significantly
influenced by external and unpredictable factors
(e.g., boom of banana) and the articulation and
conflict between different rationalities at work,
which are confronted in the common arena of
project development.
In sum, this review of UWIRP in the lower
Walawe Basin underscores the importance of
realistic planning, stakeholder participation, and
adaptive management. Rather than adaptively
adjusting to unanticipated changes, planners,
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donors and managers continued to return time
and again to the original plan and launch
successive attempts at realizing the original plan.
Planning and implementation proceeded through a
typical top-down, blueprint approach that
constituted a typical example of Hirschman’s
“hiding hand” principle, whereby “ignorance of
ignorance, uncertainties, and of difficulties” is the
prelude of a “long voyage of discovery in the
most varied domains, from technology to politics”
(Hirschman 1967). The obvious drawbacks of
such top-down approaches should warrant and
encourage the adoption of process approaches on
a wider scale (see Bond 1998). Participation of
concerned stakeholders in planning is a widely
accepted principle that brings about more equity
and efficiency (Howe and Dixon 1993) but it
entails a revolution of mindsets and practices and
is eventually predicated upon wider societal
changes and democratization.
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Appendices
APPENDIX A
Work Completed in UWIRP by 1968
1. Uda Walawe reservoir
2. Irrigation system:
(a) RB: Planned length 41.8 km (26 miles);
to irrigate 10,522 ha (26,000 acres)
• 37 km (23 miles) of main RB channel
completed
• Irrigation facilities built for Tracts 1-7
covering 1,518 ha (3,750 acres)
(b) LB: Planned length 64.4 km (40 miles); to
irrigate 19,425 ha (48,000 acres)
• Work in progress: irrigation facilities for
Tracts 2-7, covering 1,518 ha (3,750
acres) near completion
• Five tanks (Kiri Ibban, Mahagama,
Gal, Vedigam and Habaralu) completed
to irrigate 728 ha (1,800 acres)
3. Land Development and Colonization
(a) RB
• 1,619 ha (4,000 acres) cleared in
Tracts 12 and 13
• Sugar area: 809 ha (2,000 acres)
cleared
• 2,023 ha (5,000 acres) cleared in
Tracts 1-7 by colonists on subsidy and
1,800 settlers on land
(b) LB: 1,012 ha (2,500 acres) cleared by
colonists on subsidy and 600 settlers on
land
(c) Youth schemes: 400 youth settled at Kiri
Ibban tank on LB and on RB
(d) Public utilities: Roads; Civic centers
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APPENDIX B
Tracts of the Uda Walawe Scheme
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APPENDIX C
Planned Command Area for UWIRP
Command area
ha acres
To be developed
RB 8,711 21,525
LB 18,648 46,080
Total 27,359 67,605
Existing irrigable area included in the Government Plan
Embilipitiya Hingura Ara and other village tanks 1,151 2,844
Uda Walawe reservoir
RB Tracts 1-7 1,520 3,755
LB: Kiri Ibban Aru, Mahagama and Suriyawewa 761 1,881
Chandrikawewa (initially excluded but later added to Plan) 2,133 5,270
Total 5,565 13,750
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT INCLUDED IN PLAN 32,924 81,355
Existing irrigable area excluded from the Government Plan
Liyangastota anicut
LB 2,513 6,210
RB 2,546 6,290
Total 5,059 12,500
Source: GOC 1969 and HTS 1968b.
APPENDIX D
Proposed Cropping Pattern
Crop Areaa
RB LB Total
ha acres ha acres ha acres
Rice 2,883 7,125 5,573 13,770 8,456 20,895
Sugar 255 630 6,993 17,280 7,248 17,910
Cotton and other OFCs 5,573 13,770 6,082 15,030 11,655 28,800
Total area to be settled 8,711 21,525 18,648 46,080 27,359 67,605
Total area already settled within project area 3,946 9,750 1,619 4,000 5,564 13,750
Total irrigable area planned and settled 12,662 31,288 20,275 50,100 32,923 81,355
a Does not include 5,666 ha (14,000 acres) for homesteads, towns, etc., and existing settlements on 4,387 ha (10,840 acres) of
unirrigable land.
Source: HTS 1968b.
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APPENDIX F
Historical Records of Visitors and Income in Uda Walawe National Park
Year No. of No. of Total no. Annual Income
local visitors foreign visitors of visitors R s US$
1991 64,939 1,572
1992 296,150 6,685
1993 2,099,595 43,851
1994 18,849 6,554 25,403 4,209,124 85,274
1995 21,284 7,438 28,722 4,975,667 97,067
1996 33,602 6,180 39,782 7,974,000 144,169
1997 54,006 3,275 57,281 6,400,000 108,438
1998 48,101 15,733 63,834 18,800,000a 288,034a
1999 69,326 21,548 90,874 25,812,588a 365,669a
2000 71,144 17,641 88,785 22,477,489 287,878
2001 44,896 12,044 56,940 14,538,288a 163,646a
aEstimated values.
Source: Department of Wildlife.
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